We study equilibria in second price auctions when bidders are independently and privately informed about both their values and participation costs and their joint distributions across bidders are not necessarily identical. We show that there always exists an equilibrium in this general setting...

Affiliation has been a prominent assumption in the study of economic models with statistical dependence. Despite its large number of applications, especially in auction theory, affiliation has limitations that are important to be aware of. This paper shows that affiliation is a restrictive...

We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including bidders' valuations. We...

We devise a tractable model to study the buyer's bid double auction (BBDA) that allows correlated signals and interdependent values/costs. We demonstrate that simple, easily calculated equilibria exist in small markets. We prove that the incentive for strategic behavior vanishes at a O (1/η)...

This is a corrigendum to Theorem 15 of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) [Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions, Econometrica, 73, 93-140], which proves the existence of equilibrium with positive probability of trade for private value auctions

We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated private valuations and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for...

Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an...

We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many types of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids....

This paper establishes existence and uniqueness of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) in a double auction. The concept of QRE has the intuitive property that a deviation from best response is less likely the higher the cost associated with the deviation itself. Thanks to such property, the QRE...

This paper examines multi-battle contests whose extensive form can be represented in terms of a finite state machine. We start by showing that any contest that satisfies our assumptions decomposes into two phases, a principal phase (in which states cannot be revisited) and a concluding...