This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information … private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through bilateral ….e., as discounting and the fixed cost of search become small, all equilibria of the market game converge to perfectly …

This paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading … opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no … restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a non-trivial, full trade search equilibrium is shown to exist, equilibria …

double auction. There are frictions due to costly search and time discounting, parameterized by a single number t > 0 …

We explore the role of private information in bilateral matching and bargaining. Our model is a replica of Mortensen … equilibria in which not every meeting results in trade. All equilibria converge to perfect competition as the frictions of search … costs and discounting are removed. We find that private information may deter entry. Because of matching externalities, this …

whole economy where all markets are open. -- Matching and Bargaining ; Search ; Foundations for Perfect Competition ; Two …This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information … private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through a Bayesian …

condition. -- Bargaining ; Search ; Matching ; Two-sided Incomplete Information …This paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading … opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no …

This paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading … opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no … restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a non-trivial, full trade search equilibrium is shown to exist, equilibria …

This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information … private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through bilateral ….e., as discounting and the fixed cost of search become small, all equilibria of the market game converge to perfectly …