lead to suboptimal institutional choice. -- voting ; punishment ; voluntary contributions ; heterogeneity ; experiment … a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward … them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective …

a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward … them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective … regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of …

a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward … them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective … regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of …

a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward … them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective … regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of …

anger, ‘social’ emotions like shame and guilt need to be present for punishment to be an effective deterrent of …

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in … situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is … when subjects can vote on the institutional setting. We find that punishment is significantly higher when the sanctioning …

-riding. However, people also obey law backed by mild sanctions if it is accepted in a referendum. We show that voting for mild law …

goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to … decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three … participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams …