This paper examines how the option of a regulated linear input price affects vertical contracting, where a monopolistic upstream supplier sequentially offers supply contracts to two symmetric downstream firms. We find that equilibrium contracts vary with production cost and regulated price...

This paper examines how the option of a regulated linear input price affects vertical contracting, where a monopolistic upstream supplier sequentially offers supply contracts to two symmetric downstream firms. We find that equilibrium contracts vary with production cost and regulated price...

This paper examines how the option of a regulated linear input price affects vertical contracting, where a monopolistic upstream supplier sequentially offers supply contracts to two symmetric downstream firms. We find that equilibrium contracts vary with production cost and regulated price...

This paper examines how the option of a regulated linear input price affects vertical contracting, where a monopolistic upstream supplier sequentially offers supply contracts to two symmetric downstream firms. We find that equilibrium contracts vary with production cost and regulated price...

We consider a model of a monopolistic network operator who sequentially offers two-parted access charges to symmetric downstream firms. We are particularly interested in analyzing an alternative to current regulatory practice of prescribing access. In particular, we look at the possibility of...

We consider a model of a monopolistic network operator who sequentially offers two-parted access charges to symmetric downstream firms. We are particularly interested in analyzing an alternative to current regulatory practice of prescribing access. In particular, we look at the possibility of...

This paper analyzes supply tariffs that discriminate between resale in different markets. In a setting with competing retailers that operate in multiple (independent or interdependent) markets, we show that, all else equal, a monopolist supplier wants to discriminate against resale in the market...

This paper examines the output effect of third-degree price discrimination in symmetrically differentiated oligopoly. We find that when the sellers' input costs are chosen endogenously by an upstream supplier with market power, as opposed to being fixed exogenously, long-standing qualitative...

We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs. Under discriminatory pricing, downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs. Under uniform...