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A geometric approach to mechanism design
Goeree, Jacob K; Kushnir, Alexey - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2011
compatibility. Borrowing results from majorization theory that date back to the work of Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya (1929) we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399646
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A geometric approach to mechanism design
Goeree, Jacob K.; Kushnir, Alexey - 2011
incentive compatibility and refine the support function to include incentive constraints using arguments from majorization … facilitates a unified approach to a range of social choice problems, including auctions, bargaining, and public goods provision … both types of incentive constraints. -- convex sets ; support functions ; majorization ; Hotelling's lemma ; mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009741027
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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 511-544
This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308444
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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2017
This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657364
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Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement : conference paper
Rosar, Frank; Müller, Florian - 2014 - (This version: February 5, 2014)
For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490631
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Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining
Zhang, Jun - 2016
bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully characterize an optimal mechanism under general conditions. Surprisingly, in … this optimal mechanism, the seller never allocates the object to the regular buyer regardless of his bargaining power in … if resale is prohibited. We find that the seller's revenue is increasing in the publicly known buyer's bargaining power …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366
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A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence
Chung, Kim-sau; Olszewski, Wojciech - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 4, pp. 469-487
We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702275
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132
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Extremal incentive compatible transfers
Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 1, pp. 134-164
We characterize the boundaries of the set of transfers (extremal transfers) implementing a given allocation rule without imposing any assumptions on the agentʼs type space or utility function besides quasi-linearity. Exploiting the concept of extremal transfers allows us to obtain an exact...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042935
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Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2009
For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877136