Showing 1 - 10 of 13
of government in the insolvency-resolution process. Consistent with an hypothesis that FDICIA has improved incentives … transitions and the character of insolvency resolutions have changed substantially under FDICIA. The average interval between bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464072
risk taking and resolving insolvency promptly, and for being held accountable for how well they perform these tasks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470500
This paper studies the impact of technological change and regulatory competition on governmental efforts to generate rents for banks in two stylized regulatory environments. In the first environment, incentive-conflicted regulators attempt to create rents by restricting the size and scope of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471631
This paper analyzes the methods of loss concealment used by rogue traders in the Barings and Daiwa scandals. The analysis clarifies how and why these firms' top managers and home-country regulators deserve blame for allowing cumulative losses to become so large. The central point is that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471988
Regulation consists of rulemaking and enforcement. Economic theory offers two complementary rationales for regulating financial institutions. Altruistic public-benefits theories treat rules as governmental instruments for increas- ing fairness and efficiency across society as a whole....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472798
Banks are in the business of taking calculated risks. Expanding the geographic footprint of an organization's profit-making activities changes the geographic pattern of its exposure to loss in ways that are hard for regulators and supervisors to observe. This paper tests and confirms the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463202
This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464752
Financial safety nets are incomplete social contracts that assign responsibility to various economic sectors for preventing, detecting, and paying for potentially crippling losses at financial institutions. This paper uses the theories of incomplete contracts and sequential bargaining to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465955
efficiently with cross-border issues. To track and control insolvency risk within and across any set of countries, officials must …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466806
As financial institutions and markets transact more and more cross-border business, gaps and flaws in national safety nets become more consequential. Because citizens of host (home) countries may be made to pay for mistakes made in the home (host) country, Basel's lead-regulator paradigm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466813