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Evolutionary Learning in the Ultimatum Game

Riechmann, Thomas - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

The ultimatum game is (in)famous for its `anomalies': The outcomes of laboratory experiments are very different from the results generated by traditional game theory. This paper aims to find to what extent these discrepancies between theory and experiments can be explained by the effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345615

Holdup and the Evolution of Bargaining Conventions

Dawid, Herbert; MacLeod, Bentley - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

As Posner (1997) has observed, when individuals in a relationship can commit to imposing costs upon each other then efficient behavior in the absence of law is possible. The question is whether efficient norms of behavior evolve endogenously in a population. We show that in a standard hold up...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005706768

Stable Risk Sharing

Dutta, Jayasri; Prasad, Kislaya - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

We evaluate the stability of risk-sharing contracts in the presence of moral hazard. Contracts are rules for sharing … their choice and apply methods of evolutionary stability. We identify stable contracts, which survive competition against …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005132862

Stability Analysis of Heterogeneous Learning in Self-Referential Linear Stochastic Models

Giannitsarou, Chryssi - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

agents and homogeneous learning. We study the local stability of REEs under heterogeneous adaptive learning, for the broad … general conditions for local stability of an REE. Even though in general, hetereogeneity may lead to different stability … conditions, we provide applications to various economic models where the stability conditions are identical to the conditions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345570

Numerical methods for the solution of a human capital model

Sarma, Sisira K. - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

Two finite-difference methods are constructed and used for the solution of a class of endogenous growth model with physical and human capital. Although both the numerical methods to be developed are implicit by construction, each of the methods can be implemented explicitly. The first method is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005706728

Evolving Automata Negotiate with a Variety of Opponents

Bragt, D.D.B. van; Poutre, J.A. La - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

The rapid growth of a global electronic market place, together with the establishment of standard negotiation protocols, currently leads to the development of multi-agent architectures in which artificial agents can negotiate on behalf of their users. Ideally, these agents should be able to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345571

Reserve Price Auctions with a Strong Bidder

Unver, M. Utku; Elbittar, A. Alexander - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

This paper investigates private-value `reserve price' auctions when there is a strong bidder in an n-bidder model. Consider an auction model, in which bidders draw their values from the same distribution, but then identity of the high-value bidder is revealed. This can be more plausible than the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345572

A computational model for incomplete contracts

Montoro-Pons, Juan D. - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

This work aims at connecting developments in the theory of agency and implicit contracts with research on bounded rationality and agent based computational models. These are two related areas as implicit contracts are justified on the basis of bounded rationality, which additionally is one of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345627

PARETO-IMPROVING CHEATING IN AN ECONOMIC POLICY GAME

Deissenberg, Christophe; Gonzalez, Francisco Alvarez - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

This paper presents a simple repeated-game model of interaction between the government and the private sector where, at each repetition, the government first makes a non-binding announcement about its future actions. The private sector, unsure whether or not this announcement will be respected,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005706739

Bounded Rationality and Social Cognition: A Computational Study

Hoffmann, Robert - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

This paper examines the implications of a 'strong' version of bounded rationality popular within computational and evolutionary game theory in which agents are represented by finite automata. It is argued that this view has unrealistic features in that agents of this kind are unable to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005706755