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Targeted vs. collective information sharing in networks
Kushnir, Alexey; Nichifor, Alexandru - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817258
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Harmful signaling in matching markets
Kushnir, Alexey - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010
Some labor markets have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms, e.g. the signaling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and workers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642479
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Local contraction-stability and uniqueness
Hefti, Andreas M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2013
This paper investigates the relationship between uniqueness of Nash equilibria and local stability with respect to the …, local stability and uniqueness are the same formal properties of the game. With equilibrium substitutes, local stability is … equilibria of symmetric games more stable. Finally, the relationship between the stability of the Nash best-response dynamics is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817285
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On Market Games with Misspecified Demand Functions : Long Run Outcomes and Global Dynamics
Bischi, G.I.; Chiarella, C.; Kopel, M. - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345392
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R&D networks: theory, empirics and policy implications
König, Michael David; Liu, Xiaodong; Zenou, Yves - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
We study a structural model of R&D alliance networks in which firms jointly form R&D collaborations to lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We derive the Nash equilibrium of this game, provide a welfare analysis and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010747854
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Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
Benkert, Jean-Michel - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015
We study the bilateral trade problem put forward by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) under the assumption that agents are loss-averse. We use the model developed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to find optimal mechanisms for the minimal subsidy, revenue maximization and welfare maximization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011203011
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Market experience is a reference point in judgments of fairness
Herz, Holger; Taubinsky, Dmitry - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2013
People's desire for fair transactions can play an important role in negotiations, organizations, and markets. In this paper, we show that markets can also shape what people consider to be a fair transaction. We propose a simple and generally-applicable model of path-dependent fairness...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817279
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Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition
Schmidt, Klaus M.; Bartling, Björn - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604136
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Evolutionary Learning in the Ultimatum Game
Riechmann, Thomas - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001
The ultimatum game is (in)famous for its `anomalies': The outcomes of laboratory experiments are very different from the results generated by traditional game theory. This paper aims to find to what extent these discrepancies between theory and experiments can be explained by the effects of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345615
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Holdup and the Evolution of Bargaining Conventions
Dawid, Herbert; MacLeod, Bentley - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001
As Posner (1997) has observed, when individuals in a relationship can commit to imposing costs upon each other then efficient behavior in the absence of law is possible. The question is whether efficient norms of behavior evolve endogenously in a population. We show that in a standard hold up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005706768