Showing 1 - 8 of 8
We analyze a situation where a Principal does not necessarily have all the bargaining power while negotiating a contract with an Agent by studying a dynamic multi-objective moral hazard model with hidden action. We .nd that the structure of the optimal contracts change along the Pareto Frontier,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823261
I analyse a model of incentive contracts where principals who each possesses the same monitoring technologies, contract with agents from a pool of individuals differing in their wealth endowments. Principals and agents are matched to form partnerships, and the matches are subject to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823188
We use data from a Maryland farm survey and a multivariate switching regression model with endogenous switching to investigate the effects of information asymmetries on conservation cost sharing contracts. Our estimations indicate that the role that asymmetries of information play in the impact...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823267
In this paper we analyze a repeated Principal Agent model, formulated as a Multi-Objective Optimization problem. We approximate its Pareto Frontier by using a recently proposed Multi-Objective Optimization Evolutionary Algorithm named RankMOEA. We focus on the effects of changes of productivity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685977
We consider a class of two-player quadratic games under incomplete information to study the relation between exogenous coordination motives and strategic interactions in information acquisition. The players make decisions in two stages. They decide about information acquisition in the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010687832
I analyze a problem of assigning heterogeneous agents (tenants) to heterogeneous principals (landlords), where partnerships are subject to moral hazard in effort choice. The agents differ in wealth endowment and the principals differ in land quality. When the liability of each agent is limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010687844
I analyze a problem of assigning heterogeneous agents (tenants) to heterogeneous principals (landlords), where partnerships are subject to moral hazard in effort choice. The agents differ in wealth endowment and the principals differ in land quality. When the liability of each agent is limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823217
In this paper we analyze a repeated Principal Agent model, formulated as a Multi-Objective Optimization problem. We approximate its Pareto Frontier by using a recently proposed Multi-Objective Optimization Evolutionary Algorithm named RankMOEA. We focus on the effects of changes of productivity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823313