We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals? demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

beginning of modern economic analysis of insurance activity. This chapter reviews the main theoretical and empirical … contributions in insurance economics since that time. The review begins with the role of utility, risk, and risk aversion in the … insurance literature and then summarizes work on the demand for insurance, insurance and resource allocation, moral hazard, and …

to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private … risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as … digitalization. It shows that new technologies bring new ways to challenge crosssubsidization in insurance markets and stresses the …

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand … dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamiccontract has insurance companies offeringcontracts where the terms of the contract … on individualpast performance (like in car insurances). Weinvestigate whether allowing insurance companies to offer …

beginning of modern economic analysis of insurance activity. This chapter reviews the main theoretical and empirical … contributions in insurance economics since that time. The review begins with the role of utility, risk, and risk aversion in the … insurance literature and summarizes work on the demand for insurance, insurance and resource allocation, moral hazard, and …

We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech …

We consider a model of competitive insurance markets involving both asymmetric information and ambiguity about the … accident probability. We show that there can exist a full-insurance pooling equilibrium. We also present an example where an … constraint and allows low risks to buy more insurance. Higher ambiguity also deteriorates the low risks' expected utility from …

We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterized version … of the lemons' model (Akerlof 1970) in the insurance context predicts total crowding out of low-risks when insurers offer … a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to solve this major …

private insurance markets offer full coverage at fair rates, social insurance is desirable if and only if risk and … examine the role of uniform and nonuniform social insurance to supplement a general income tax when neither public nor private … (1971) equilibrium emerges in the private insurance market and low-wage/low-risk individuals are not fully insured. We show …

We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply …