We develop a model of vertical innovation in which firms incur a market entry cost and choose a unique level of quality. Once established, firms compete for market shares, selling to consumers with heterogeneous tastes for quality. The equilibrium of the pricing game exists and is unique within...

This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from underbutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment...

After describing the essential features of the book market, a welfare analysis of the fixed book price agreement is given. Allowance is made for the opportunity cost of reading. Theoretically, the agreement pushes up book prices and depresses book sales. However, more titles will be published,...

In this paper we argue that strong political economy forces explain the rush of the EU to expand eastwards. We use a model of vertical product differentiation in order to claim that technologically- advanced EU firms (residing in high-income member countries) prefer a mutual market-opening with...

We construct a two sector general equilibrium model in which one sector produces a homogeneous good and the other sector produces a vertically differentiated good. We demonstrate that uniform (across sectors) and (Hicks) neutral technological change can cause an increase in the skill premium.

In this paper we use a model of vertical product differentiation to cast doubt on the general validity of the import demand function as specified in macroeconomic models. The empirical importance of our theoretical concerns is then examined with the aid of two hypotheses. According to the first...