This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on...

This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the...

This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations where selfish regional governments provide regional and federal public goods and the benevolent central government implements interregional earmarked and income transfers. Without residential mobility, unlimited...

In a federation with decentralized leadership, many regional governments provide multiple types of public goods and the center implements interregional income transfers. The symmetric perfect equilibrium under unlimited decentralized leadership is inefficient because regional public goods are...

This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations where selfish regional governments provide regional and federal public goods and the benevolent central government implements interregional earmarked and income transfers. Without residential mobility, unlimited...

Under the 'new normal' in the labor market, individuals can work remotely or in person, a hybrid work mode that became ubiquitous during the pandemic. This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations in which hybrid work is the modus operandi. Self-interested regional...

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather,...

This paper offers a political model of green tax reforms in which the use of the revenue from the ecotax is an integrated part. We use the model to explain why and when a link between an ecotax and cuts in other non-environmental taxes can be expected. In our model, green tax swaps arise because...

As with other public goods lacking strong special interest support, global climate policy suffers from two serious theoretical flaws. The first is failure to endogenize the labor-leisure decision when conducting benefit-cost analysis. Recognition that income generated will not remain the same...

This paper develops a two-period overlapping-generations model with environmental externalities and uncertain lifetimes, and studies how two sources of population aging, greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth, affect the politically determined environmental tax and the quality...