good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers … may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating … an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by …

with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for …

insurance sector can cause the current value of banks assets to be less than the current value of their liabilities so the banks … are insolvent. In contrast, if historic cost accounting is used, banks are allowed to continue and can meet all their …

good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers … may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating … an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by …

with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for …

insurance sector can cause the current value of banks’ assets to be less than the current value of their liabilities so the … banks are insolvent. In contrast, if historic cost accounting is used, banks are allowed to continue and can meet all their …