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In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signaling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590937
We provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency. In a market with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device. This difference alone implies that seller-certification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491434
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer ' the seller ' follows from a non-trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003975228
We provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency. In a market with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device. This difference alone implies that seller-certification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403019
identified in our experiments and give incentives to the investors (institutional and/or private) to search for alternative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479016
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283658
We provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency. In a market with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device. This difference alone implies that seller-certification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076261
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853867
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer --- the seller --- follows from a non--trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer--induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854541
We provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency. In a market with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device. This difference alone implies that seller-certification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895349