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Too many to fail - How bonus taxation prevents gambling for bailouts

Hilmer, Michael - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

Using a simple symmetric principal-agent model of two banks, this paper studies the effects of both bailouts and bonus taxes on risk taking and managerial compensation. In contrast to existing literature, we assume financial institutions to be systemic only on a collective basis, implying...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163909

Timing of Kindness Evidence from a Field Experiment

Werner, Peter; Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

We conduct a field experiment in a naturally occurring labor environment and track whether the performance of workers responds to unexpected wage increases. Specifically, we investigate how the timing of wage increases affects efforts. We find that workers performance is about 11% higher for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163933

The Heterogeneous Effects of Bonus Pay on Performance Outcomes: Evidence from Personnel Data

Sauermann, Jan - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

This study uses rich information on performance outcomes to estimate the effect of bonus pay on worker productivity. We use a policy discontinuity in the call centre of a multi-national telephone company in which management introduced monetary bonuses upon achieving pre-defined performance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163957

Adverse Selection and Information Advantages of Training Firms

Mohrenweiser, Jens; Wydra-Sommaggio, Gaby; Zwick, Thomas - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

The possibility of adverse selection by training firms is common theoretical argument for company-sponsored investments in general skills. The paper derives a public and a private signal after apprenticeship training and shows that training firms are able to positively select graduates they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164070

Do Self-Determined Wages Really Improve Employees Performance? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

Jeworrek, Sabrina; Mertins, Vanessa - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2014

Recent laboratory evidence suggests that employees who have the extraordinary right to self-determine their wages perform better. By conducting a natural field experiment, we aim to test whether this policy actually has the predicted positive effects in a real-labor market. Employees were hired...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164079

Strive to be first and avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives

Lindner, Florian; Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; … - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

levels for three tournament incentive schemes: reward tournaments, punishment tournaments, and tournaments combining reward … punishment produces the highest effort from agents, especially in contests of a relatively larger size. Punishment is shown to be … more effective and, in larger contests, more efficient than rewards, and it is also the mechanism with the lowest variance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957961

Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns

Kragl, Jenny; Gogova, Martina - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

We analyze optimal labor contracts when the worker is inequity averse towards the employer. Welfare is maximized for an equal sharing rule of surplus between the worker and the firm. That is, profit sharing is optimal even if effort is contractible. If the firm can make a take-it-or leave-it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957968

Incentive Design and Mis-Allocated Effort

Schnedler, Wendelin - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958061

Variable Pay, Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany

Jirjahn, Uwe; Heywood, John S. - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

We use a representative sample of German establishments to show that those with foreign ownership are more likely to use performance appraisal, profit sharing and employee share ownership than are those with domestic ownership. Moreover, we show that works councils are associated with an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958075

Gender Differences in Competition and Sabotage

Dato, Simon; Nieken, Petra - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013

We study the differences in behavior of males and females in a two-player tournament with sabotage in a controlled lab experiment. Implementing a real-effort design and a principal who is paid based on the agent s output, we find that males and females do not differ in their achievements in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958084