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Intrafirm Conflicts and Interfirm Price Competition
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We study interfirm price competition in the presence of horizontal and vertical intrafirm conflicts in each firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a principal-agent framework with firms employing more than one agent and implementing a tournament incentive scheme. The principals offer premium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009319067
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Intra-firm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competition on a duopolistic market with seller firms employing one or more agents and implementing tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to higher incentive intensity, higher efforts and output...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090490
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Productivity in Contests: Organizational Culture and Personality Effects
Andersson, Ola; Huysentruyt, Marieke; Miettinen, Topi; … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
We study the interaction of organizational culture and personal prosocial orientation in team work where teams compete against each other. In a computerized lab experiment with minimal group design, we prime subjects to two alternative organizational cultures emphasizing either self-enhancement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511325
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See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams
Steiger, Eva-Maria; Ro'i Zultan - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009317896
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Tournaments and Piece Rates Revisited: A Theoretical and Experimental Study of Premium Incentives
Güth, Werner; Levínský, Rene; Pull, Kerstin; Weisel, Ori - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research … focused on fixed-prize tournaments, i.e., on tournaments where the prize or prize sum to be awarded is set in advance, we …-prize tournaments, are based on relative performance, the prize to be awarded is not set in advance but is a function of the firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511332
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What renders financial advisors less treacherous? - On commissions and reciprocity -
Popva, Vera - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511336
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Corporate Social Responsibility in the work place - Experimental evidence on CSR from a gift-exchange game
Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We analyze the effect of investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on workers' motivation. In our experiment, a gift exchange game variant, CSR is captured by donating a certain share of profits to a charity. We are testing for CSR effects by varying the possible share of profits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144129
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539175
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Hidden Costs of Control: Three Repetitions and an Extension
Ploner, Matteo; Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) low and medium control treatments with 364 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool of students and demographics vary across samples. Our results largely conflict with those of the original study. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008478714
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Explaining Gender Differences in Competitiveness: Gender-Task Stereotypes
Grosse, Niels D.; Riener, Gerhard - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Gender-specific patterns of self-selection into competitive and cooperative environments may have multiple reasons. One of the most prominent explanations to this point is, that there are inherent differences between men and women when it comes to preferences regarding competition. We take a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008487471