Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where...

From a special class of TU games with information cost, given by the problem of sharing the costs of facilities among users, we build a noncooperative game in which every player asks for the assessment of whom the users are. We analyze two models, "naming" game and majority decision game: the...

We introduce the game in cover function form, which is a bargaining game of sequential offers for endogenous overlapping coalitions. This extension of games in partition function form removes the restriction to disjoint coalitions. We discuss the existence of equilibria, and we develop an...

In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperative game. Players choose independently which coalition they want to join. The payoffs to the players are determined by an allocation rule on the underlying game and the coalition structure that...

Conditional on the considered equilibrium, the probability of a bank run in the demand-deposit contract models of Bryant (1980) and of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is either one or zero. In contrast, we establish the existence of an interval - being a strict subset of the unit-interval - of...

When the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) formally adopted the principle of “open regionalism” (OR) in its trade liberalization in 1991, many were optimistic that this approach suggested the bloc as a stepping stone toward global free trade. This optimistic view was reinforced by the...

In this article, we revisit evolutionary stability in matrix games. We provide a new direct proof to characterize a pure evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), in games with exactly two pure strategies, as a strategy that is evolutionarily stable against multiple mutations. This direct proof...

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

We know that a) two-player symmetric zero-sum games with non-empty equilibrium sets always admit symmetric equilibria and that b) two-player and multiplayer symmetric non-zero-sum games might have only asymmetric equilibria (Fey, 2012). But what about multiplayer symmetric zero-sum games? This...

It is known that not every symmetric game has a symmetric equilibrium because there are examples of symmetric games that fail to have any equilibria at all. But this leads to the following question: If a symmetric game has a Nash equilibrium, does it have a symmetric Nash equilibrium? In this...