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This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140
We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190389
The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283143
spillovers in technology agreements. We utilize the coalition-proof concept to refine the set of Nash equilibria and identify …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038214
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993318
We investigate the scope for cooperation within a community engaged in repeated reciprocal interactions. Players seek the help of others and approach them sequentially according to some fixed order, that is, a ranking profile. We study the ranking profiles that are most effective in sustaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009684223
distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602846
show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593632
We study coalition formation problems with general externalities. We prove that if expectations are not prudent a … stable coalitions structure can fail to exist. Under prudent expectations a stable coalition structure exists if the set of … admissible coalitions is single-lapping. This assumption also guarantees the existence of a stable and efficient coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014256282