When self-interested agents compete for scarce resources, they often exaggerate the promise of their activities. As such, principals must consider both the quality of each opportunity and each agent's credibility. We show that principals are better off with less transparency because they gain...

Venture projects are fraught with exogenous market risk and endogenous agency risk. We apply a real options perspective to analyze the investment decision of the venture capitalist (VC) in this set-up. The solutions presented are conflictive: the VC reduces his exposure to exogenous risk by...

Equality of opportunity is usually defined as a situation where the effect of circumstances on outcome is nullified (compensation principle) and effort is rewarded (reward principle). We propose a new version of the reward principle based on the idea that effort deserves reward for it is costly....

A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibil- ity is satis?ed, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution functions. Thus, tools from choice under uncertainty can be...

Supervisors occupy central roles in production and performance monitoring. We study how heterogeneity in performance evaluations across supervisors affects employee and supervisor careers and firm outcomes using data on the performance system of a Scandinavian service sector firm. We show that...

We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster virtuous behavior. A Principal seeks to motivate reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public-spiritedness, private signal about the value of the...

Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht empirisch die Effekte von nicht-finanziellen Zielen von Eigentümern von Familienunternehmen auf die finanzielle Leistung von Familienunternehmen. Um die nicht-finanziellen Ziele abzubilden wurde das Socioemotional Wealth (SEW) Model herangezogen. Während das...

Background: For over 40 years, the franchise ownership redirection hypothesis has attracted the attention of many scholars. This study, differing from previous ones, proposes an alternative approach for this hypothesis using a real options framework with the extension of agency theory. Method:...

Delegated contracting describes a widely observable agency mode where a top principal, who has no direct access to a productive downstream agent, hires an intermediary to forward a sub-contract with specified output targets and payments. The principal makes the payment to the intermediary...

I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of effort by the choice of the project mission. The principal's and the agents' mission preferences are misaligned, and the agents have unobservable intrinsic motivation levels. I...

In this doctoral thesis, I explore how vague behavioural or legal standards affect agents’ decision-making. In particular, I test the extent to which agents engage in defensive behaviour in order to signal a professional qualification or in the face of vague legal standards. I measure...

The aim of this arti cle is to show that the New Insti tuti onal Economics is an interdisciplinary stream combining economics, law, organizati on theory, politi cal sciences, sociology, and anthropology. The main theories which are part of the New Insti tuti onal Economics are: Agency Theory,...