We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model in which a present-biased government, the agent, chooses public investment levels given a deficit rule imposed by the principal. The principal sets a deficit cap to curb current debt-financed consumption. In doing so, it also reduces long-term...

We study a dynamic principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about the importance of effort. The quality of the agent's output is not observed directly. Instead, the principal jointly designs an evaluation technology and a wage schedule. More precise performance evaluation reduces...

This study examines the performance of family businesses through the theoretical lenses of dynamic capabilities and socioemotional wealth. A conceptual model is proposed, in which socioemotional wealth moderates the relationship between dynamic capabilities and family firm performance. The...

This study investigates the relationship between cyber risks and dividend policy, as well as how boards, as a governance mechanism, affect the dividend policy under cyber risk. This study collected firm-level financing, corporate governance, and control variables from the Bloomberg database...

This paper explores informality in a high income country among women who, at least legally, can take on formal jobs. Specifically, we examine the determinants of paid domestic work in Israel through the lens of existing theoretical frameworks of informality. Using rich administrative data, we...

The aim of this work is to analyze the factors that help companies avoid liquidation following the spirit of the Spanish insolvency law. This work focuses on the phase starting when companies file for bankruptcy and ending with the completion of the common phase. We apply the agency theory to...

Peer evaluation tournaments are common in academia, the arts, and corporate environments. They make use of the expert knowledge that academics or team members have in assessing their peers’ performance. However, rampant opportunities for cheating may throw a wrench in the process unless,...

We study a situation where physicians differing in their degree of altruism exert a diagnostic effort before deciding whether to test patients to determine the most appropriate treatment. The diagnostic effort generates an imperfect private signal of the patient’s type, while the test is...

In this study, we focus on managerial incentives provided by debt-like compensation and further investigate whether and to what extent such managerial incentives may affect CEOs' decisions on risk management. Building on cumulative prospect theory and instrumental stakeholder theory, we propose...

This paper empirically examines the impact of CEO narcissism on corporate financialization using Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009-2022. The results find that CEO narcissism leads to corporate financialization, and the promotion is more significant in lower cash flow,...