Search Results - subject_exact:"Auction theory"

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When speed is of essence : perishable goods auctions

Hafalir, Isa; Kesten, Onur; Sherstyuk, Katerina; Tao, Cong - 2025

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015420759

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When speed is of essence : perishable goods auctions

Hafalir, Isa; Kesten, Onur; Sherstyuk, Katerina; Tao, Cong - 2023

Book / Working Paper

Analysis of the competition of the South-Eastern Railway of Peru through a timetable auction

Aliaga-Miranda, Augusto; Flores-Vilcapoma, Luis Ricardo; … - 2025

Our research analyzes the design of an auction model for railway transportation on the South-East Railway of Peru, managed by Ferrocarril Transandino S.A. (Fetransa) and operated by PeruRail. Initially, the regulatory framework aimed to promote competition in railway transportation through...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015408245

Managing the electricity distribution connection queue in Great Britain : lessons from auction theory and a potential position trading system

Pollitt, Michael G.; Mitchell, Rona; Duma, Daniel; … - 2025

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015643259

Experiments on the different numbers of bidders in sequential auctions

Gunay, Hikmet; Huamán Aguilar, Ricardo - 2024

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014526283

Average incremental cost pricing in electricity auctions

Stevens, Nicolas; O'Neill, Richard; Papavasiliou, Anthony - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015617398

Divisive by design shaping values in optimal mechanisms

Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2026 - 2., überarbeitete Auflage

We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015609713

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Divisive by design : shaping values in optimal mechanisms

Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2025

Book / Working Paper

Divisive by design shaping values In optimal mechanisms

Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2025

Book / Working Paper

Investments in first-price and second-price procurement auctions

Ceesay, Muhammed; Doni, Nicola; Menicucci, Domenico - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015611521

Information design and entry in auctions

Innocenti, Federico; Doni, Nicola; Menicucci, Domenico - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015611906

All-pay auctions with different forfeits

Kang, Benjamin; Unwin, James - 2026

In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction,...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015615283

Non-price criteria in renewable energy auctions and consequences for the European solar PV industry

Deletombe, Thibault - 2026

The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) promotes non-price criteria in renewable auctions. It aims to unlock green willingness-to-pay and scale up manufacturing capacity for net-zero technologies in the European Union (EU). This paper builds a partial equilibrium model of the European solar module...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015588351

Bidding strategy for the lithium battery energy storage system in day-ahead and real-time markets

Lv, Jinzhou; Guo, Yongjian; Zhao, Guangjin; Dong, Ruifeng; … - 2026

The lithium battery energy storage system (ESS) faces problems such as market price fluctuation and uncertainty of frequency modulation (FM) signals when participating in power market. Day-ahead bidding behavior bears revenue risk and real-time bidding behavior needs to adjust. It is necessary...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015603738

Calibrated mechanism design

Doval, Laura; Smolin, Alex - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015586902

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Calibrated mechanism design

Doval, Laura; Smolin, Alex - 2026

Book / Working Paper

Watt's better? : Pay-as-bid vs. Uniform pricing in electricity market

Rottner, Claudio - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015638309

Ex post strategy-proofness

Feng, Tangren; Wu, Qinggong - 2026 - This Version: February 5, 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015639587

Procuring innovation through bid preference : an experiment

Camboni, Riccardo; Corazzini, Luca; Galavotti, Stefano; … - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015640930

Partial identification of the valuation distribution in sequential English auctions

Kim, Dongwoo; Kim, Kyoo Il; Pal, Pallavi - 2026

This paper extends the incomplete model of Haile and Tamer (2003) from static English auctions to sequential English auctions. Because bidders may wait for future opportunities, the static condition that bidders do not let rivals win at beatable prices need not hold. We replace it with a dynamic...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015643934

Risks, rates, and rays : domestic financing shapes Brazil's utility-scale solar PV costs in regulated auctions

Monroy Gomez, Santiago; Jansen, Malte - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015644732

Competition, contracts and auctions for renewable electricity support : competition for the market but not yet in the market

Green, Richard; Newbery, David M. G. - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015655723

Farmers' acceptance of agri-environmental auctions : a survey experiment

Coiffard, Adrien; Préget, Raphaële; Tidball, Mabel - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015656805

Bidding wind and solar : a theory of price premia in sequential electricity markets

Keutz, Julian - 2026

Price premia between day-ahead and intraday electricity markets are well documented and often attributed to factors such as forecast errors or market frictions. However, existing explanations provide limited insight into why these price premia can exhibit a systematic diurnal structure, as...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015632473

Set-aside auctions and small businesses' participation in public procurement : an empirical analysis

Shagbazian, Gegam; Valbonesi, Paola; Tkachenko, Andrey; … - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015633860

Equity in auction design with unit-demand agents and non-quasilinear preferences

Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2026

We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pair need not be quasilinear. If the domain contains all classical preferences, we show that there is a...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015634013

How to sell debt (but not money)

Daripa, Arupratan - 2026

Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a uniform-price format is used. In this paper, we...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015636907

Bidder opportunism, familiarity, and the M&A payment choice

Lohmeier, Nils; Schneider, Christoph - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015559060

An experimental study of a continuous Japanese-English auction for the wallet game

Georgalos, Konstantinos; Gonçalves, Ricardo; Ray, Indrajit - 2026

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value 'wallet game'. The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour:...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015561139

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An experimental study of a continuous Japanese-English auction for the wallet game

Georgalos, Konstantinos; Silva, Ricardo Gonçalves; … - 2025

Book / Working Paper

Soft-floor auctions : harnessing regret to improve efficiency and revenue

Bergemann, Dirk; Breuer, Kevin; Cramton, Peter C.; … - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015669072

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Soft-floor auctions: harnessing regret to improve efficiency and revenue

Bergemann, Dirk; Breuer, Kevin; Cramton, Peter C.; … - 2025

Book / Working Paper

Photovoltaic manufacturing in the EU requires a unified industrial strategy

Deletombe, Thibault; Neuhoff, Karsten - 2026

Solar photovoltaic (PV) electricity is critical for providing Europe with a steady supply of decarbonized energy at competitive prices. To ensure the supply of solar PV modules, the European Union (EU) aims to meet 40 percent of its demand with domestic products by 2030. To achieve this goal, EU...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015666439

Efficient dynamic mechanism design without a common prior

Bergemann, Dirk; Bojko, Marek - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015670983

Ascending-price sequential selling : fair strategy-proof allocation with pure costs

Adachi, Tsuyoshi; Lin, Zheng - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015671812

Not yet: humans outperform LLMs in a Colonel Blotto Tournament

Dagaev, Dmitry; Ivanov, Egor; Parshakov, Petr; … - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015671568

A secret worth keeping? : bid cap design in budget-constrained procurement auctions

Auer, Josephine; Friesen, Lana; Mackenzie, Ian A. - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015671413

Improving broadband subsidy allocation : algorithmic and policy insights from Israel

Eliyahu, Erez; Neeman, Zvika - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015677386

An auction-based mechanism for decentralised backlog management in industry 4.0 semi-heterarchical architectures

Vespoli, Silvestro; De Martino, Maria; Grassi, Andrea; … - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015959003

Behavioral measures for laboratory market experiments : a survey

Cacho, Binierose; Sherstyuk, Katerina - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015677644

Intraday price pressure and order flow around U.S. Treasury auctions

Fleming, Michael J.; Liu, Weiling; Nguyen, Giang H. - 2026 - Revised July 2026

Using 33 years of intraday Treasury data, we provide the first high-frequency evidence on auction-day price pressure: yields rise in the hours before auction and reverse afterward. This pressure strengthens when dealers face tighter risk-bearing constraints and weakens when investor demand is...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015618080

Istanbul flower auction : the need for speed

Hafalir, Isa; Kesten, Onur; Luo, Donglai; Sherstyuk, … - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016061524

Competition modulates buyers' reaction to sellers' cheap talk

Onderstal, Sander; Shalvi, Shaul; Soraperra, Ivan - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016071009

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Competition modulates buyers' reaction to sellers' cheap talk

Onderstal, Sander; Shalvi, Shaul; Soraperra, Ivan - 2023

Book / Working Paper

Comparative analysis of price-maker bidding strategies in electricity markets in the context of rising share of new technologies

Mantke, Henrik; De Blauwe, Jilles; Frey, Georg; Keles, Dogan - 2026

The expansion of renewable generation, demand response and transmission capacities between electricity markets in different countries and regions change electricity markets by increasing heterogeneity in the cost structure of generation and demand. This creates new opportunities for strategic...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015677798

Disaster risk and property valuation : a study of auction assets in earthquake-prone Yogyakarta

Saleh, Rahmat; Dwi Asmara, Gea; Wulandari, Nurafifah - 2026

This study aims to determine and identify the effects of property characteristics including exposure time, elevation adjustment, and topographic adjustment and disaster characteristics, such as seismicity, on the value of auctioned assets (collateral). The research employs multiple regression...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016071022

Competing mechanisms in games played through agents : theory and experiment

Han, Seungjin; Leal, Andrew - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016073428

Behavioral mechanism design as a benchmark for experimental studies

Levine, David K. - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016073542

Information disclosure, bidder entry, and auction revenues : evidence from eBay

Eddhir, Ahmed - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016073398

Interaction of spectrum auctions and mobile market competition : review of theory and evidence from European 4G auctions

Ershov, Daniel; Salant, David J. - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016083381

Purely procedural preferences in auctions, with a comment to: Equality of opportunity and the acceptability of outcome inequality

Chlaß, Nadine - 2026

Sugden and Wang (2020) are among the first to model intrinsic concerns for equal opportunities. Their study reports that after being subjected to unequal opportunities, people experience anger, resentment, and greed and all parties involved engage in socially wasteful destruction of resources....

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016070554

Moderate externalities in all-pay contests

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016063858

First-price sealed-bid auctions with smoothly ambiguity-averse bidders

Ma, Tianyu; Riedel, Frank - 2026

We analyze first-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in which bidders are uncertain about the distribution of their opponents’ valuations and have smooth ambiguity preferences. We characterize the unique non- decreasing symmetric equilibrium, whose bidding function solves...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016062595

The costs and benefits of mediocrity : endogenous auction design in procurement

Stähler, Frank; Tulli, Andrea - 2026

We study bidding in a broad class of price-based procurement mechanisms in which the lowest bid does not always win. These mechanisms are used when cost overruns and non-compliance affect contract execution. We first characterize equilibrium bidding behavior in a general setting with endogenous...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016086469

Experimental evidence on the behavioral (in)efficiency of search-and-matching market institutions

Chan, Kenneth; Fahim, Samuel - 2026

We design a lab experiment to study three different search-and-matching market institutions: (1) price posting with directed search, (2) bargaining with directed search, and (3) bargaining with a guaranteed match. We compare their performance in terms of market efficiency, prices of goods, and...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015675511

Ambitious forest biodiversity conservation under scarce public funds : introducing a deferrence mechanism to conservation auctions

Kangas, Johanna; Kotiaho, Janne S.; Ollikainen, Markku - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016087254

Buying a station or relaxing a constraint? : spectrum repacking and Dirac's conjecture

Chan, Alex - 2026

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10016088509