Our research analyzes the design of an auction model for railway transportation on the South-East Railway of Peru, managed by Ferrocarril Transandino S.A. (Fetransa) and operated by PeruRail. Initially, the regulatory framework aimed to promote competition in railway transportation through...

We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without additional incentives. We propose the use of a wait time auction, where individuals bid the...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Whereas we confirm the theoretical prediction...

Many auctions and procurement contests entail nontrivial bidding costs, which makes the bidders’ participation decisions endogenous to the auction design. We analyze the effect of different auction rules on potential bidders’ incentives to participate. We focus on first-price auctions with...

We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receivers inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Whereas we confirm the theoretical prediction...

We study the design of efficient mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. Assuming quasi-linear utilities and private values, we show that we can implement in conditional dominant strategies a social...

Casting mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982) implies that his generalized revelation principle directly applies, and we thus obtain standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends, however, on whether the presentation of...

Fog computing introduces a new dimension to the network edge by pooling diverse resources (e.g., processing power, memory, and bandwidth). However, allocating resources from heterogeneous fog nodes often faces limited capacity. To overcome these limitations, integrating fog nodes with cloud...

We present an experimental test of a procedurally fair co-determination mechanism where group members reduce their value uncertainty before submitting bids for a joint project. The results suggest a relatively efficient mechanism, with unprofitable projects being largely rejected and profitable...

The profitable exploitation of asset portfolios in the European electricity markets has become more challenging in recent years. This is particularly true for combined heat and power (CHP) generation units that are often facing must-run conditions due to heat demands that need to be satisfied....

Ranaldo and Rossi (2016) presented data on the history of Swiss treasury bond auctions that covered the period from 1980, when the auction mechanism was implemented, to 2014. In this study, we extend the set of observations until 2023 and provide additional information for the entire sample. In...

Heterogeneous interconnections, which link regulated electricity markets to liberalised ones, are becoming increasingly important. Several such interconnections are set to be established in the near future especially between European and North African countries (e.g., Tunisia-Italy,...

I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long‐lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when...

In the 19 th century, auctions became a widespread form of transaction for real estate in England. Contemporaries viewed auctioning as an effective method for the transaction of land, in terms of price determination and transparency. Contrary to these theoretical assumptions, the article shows...

Crowdshipping is a new delivery paradigm that exploits the capacity of ordinary people who offer their own vehicles and free time to perform deliveries against compensation. In this work, we consider a peer-to-peer logistic platform where a company receives orders from its customers and assigns...

Public procurement contracts require frequent renegotiation. We exploit the Czech implementation of an EU policy as a natural experiment to investigate the effect of eased renegotiation rules. We document that the eased renegotiation rules decreased winning bids but did not change the final...

We examine a setting of independent private value auctions where bidders can covertly acquire gradual information about their valuations. We demonstrate that a dynamic pivot mechanism implements the rst-best information acquisition and allocation rule. We apply our results to a commonly used...