We examine democratic public-good provision with heterogeneous legislators. Decisions are taken by majority rule and an agenda-setter proposes a level of the public good, taxes, and subsidies. Members are heterogeneous with respect to their benefits from the public good. We find that, depending...

This paper analyzes the pricing dynamics of product warranties by developing a three-player hierarchical game model involving a manufacturer, an independent service agent, and a consumer. The model provides a scenario where the manufacturer and the agent form a coalition to coordinate pricing...

We analyze the endogenous formation of patent pools among three patent owners and the associated welfare effects. Under a condition of synergistic three-patent combination, either a unique symmetric equilibrium or infinitely many asymmetric equilibria can arise when patents are fragmented. By...

We investigate power indices for simple games with precoalitions which distribute power among players in an external and an internal step. We extend an existing approach which uses the Public Good index both on the external level in the quotient game as well as on the internal level for...

The well-known cooperative game solution core, with its strict stability requirement, provides no solution for non-balanced games. Subiza et al. (2025) relaxes the stability concept of the core and proposes δ-stable set, a non-empty solution for every essential TU-game. However, their approach...

The Education for Climate Coalition is a flagship initiative of the European Education Area and the Green Deal hosted by the European Commission. As a community of practice, it enriches both the Council recommendation on learning for the green transition and sustainable development and the...

In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two solutions: 𝐧∗, which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games, and equilibrium binding agreements, which...

We study coalition formation with externalities under voluntary, non-binding participation. Motivated by climate agreements, where standard modeling predicts small, inefficient coalitions, we propose a new solution concept - the self-enforcing stable set. It synthesizes the self-enforcing logic...

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target...

We examine democratic public-good provision with heterogeneous legislators. Decisions are taken by majority rule and an agenda-setter proposes a level of the public good, taxes, and subsidies. Members are heterogeneous with respect to their benefits from the public good. We find that, depending...

Worldwide academia is going through a major transformation because of Open Science and Recognition and Rewards movements that are linked to big societal challenges such as climate change, digitalization, growing inequality, migration, political instability, democracies under threat and...

The Education for Climate Coalition is a flagship initiative of the European Education Area and the Green Deal hosted by the European Commission. As a community of practice, it enriches both the Council recommendation on learning for the green transition and sustainable development and the...

The increasing electoral success of populist radical-right parties poses a significant challenge to established political parties in Western democracies. While mainstream parties often maintain a policy of non-cooperation with these newcomers, such cordon sanitaire strategies can become...

We analyze a two-stage coalition formation game in which the provision of the global public good is not only associated with variable costs but also with fixed costs. We consider the assumptions that signatories share or do not share fixed costs. We show that fixed costs may imply corner...

The brief emphasises the need to translate climate commitments into effective policies, focusing on carbon pricing mechanisms like emissions trading, carbon taxes, and crediting mechanisms led by public authorities. - Carbon pricing cooperation is essential for increasing climate ambition,...

Countries increasingly form alliances to collectively impose sanctions. However, the resulting impact of such coordination remains unclear. Analyzing the 2014 wave of sanctions against Russia over 400,000 simulations with a quantitative trade model, this report demonstrates that multilateral...