Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target...

Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of...

We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which differ in the size of the rooms to be filled, the...

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target...

A rich and growing literature illustrates the paradox of COVID-19 responses by governments across the world. States with higher levels of authority and capacity have struggled to respond effectively to COVID-19, while states with low capacity and authority have been more effective in containing...

This paper studies the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests: how players organize themselves in groups when faced with the common objective of securing a prize by exerting costly effort. The model presented adopts an axiomatic approach by assuming certain properties for the...

We study the endogenous formation of climate coalitions linked to a preferential free trade arrangement. In a multi-stage strategic trade and participation game, coalition and fringe countries dispose of a discriminatory tariff on dirty imports as well as emission permits imposed on domestic...

In the standard theoretical literature on forming international environmental agreements (IEAs) countries use to be self-interested materialists and stable coalitions are small. This paper analyzes IEA games with countries that exhibit Kantian moral behavior. Countries may behave morally with...

This paper studies the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests: how players organize themselves in groups when faced with the common objective of securing a prize by exerting costly effort. The model presented adopts an axiomatic approach by assuming certain properties for the...

This paper studies the formation of international climate coalitions by heterogeneous countries. Countries rationally predict the consequences of their membership decisions in climate negotiations. We offer an approach to characterise the equilibrium number of coalitions and their number of...

Several recent studies find that interventions in schools can have important lasting consequences for students, and that schools differ in their contribution to students’ learning. However, there is less research investigating how these differences between schools influence longer-term...

This study investigates the determinants of participation in environmental agreements. To this end, we collated the largest ratification dataset in the literature. Unlike previous data sets, ours includes both global and regional agreements and identifies all countries eligible for membership in...

This paper studies the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests: how players organize themselves in groups when faced with the common objective of securing a prize by exerting costly effort. The model presented adopts an axiomatic approach by assuming certain properties for the...

As a member of priori coalition, the motivation for a player to participate in the grand coalition is to get more payoff value, so the scale of the priori coalition needs to be considered in the allocation among the priori coalitions. Considering the size difference of prior coalitions, two...

Cooperative game theory addresses two problems: coalition formation and payoff distribution. To focus on the payoff distribution problem, cooperative game theorists usually assume the formation of the grand coalition, i.e., full cooperation by all individuals when such cooperation generates the...

It is widely agreed that durable authoritarian rule requires power-sharing institutions. But how do autocrats rule under such institutions? We analyze formally how an autocrat distributes information inside the coalition to preserve and consolidate power while remaining constrained by the...

Spatial models in retailing allow for correlations among purchase decisions from consumers within predefined geographic areas. The purpose of these models is to control for unobserved demand side effects at the regional-level (e.g., a neighborhood), but they typically ignore synergies among...

Carpooling service, as a sustainable transportation mode, has gained great interest in both industry and academic fields. However, existing TNC carpooling services provide prescriptive solutions without coordinating riders’ route choices, while each rider’s route choices will affect other...

We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of...

This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii)...

This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii)...

Free riding incentives make it difficult to control climate change. To improve the chances of the Paris Agreement's ambitious goal, many nations are forming scientific networks in carbon capture and storage (CCS). These networks take many forms (bilateral, hub-and-spoke, and multilateral)....

Given a fixed network that links various actors, we introduce a formal model that describes the structural stability of coalitions. To this end, we used the partition of the set of all actors in three distinct positions: members, i.e., those who are central to a coalition; participants, i.e.,...

In the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value of a non-convex cooperative game, we derive a procedure to find out a convex game in which the Egalitarian Allocation is a coalitional rational value. The procedure depends on the relationship between two parameters called the Convexity Threshold...

We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any coalition formed (joined)...

We study a coordination game where N players simultaneously and independently decide whether to take a certain action or not. Players' payoffs depend only on how many players take each action (i.e., the coalition size) and there is incomplete information on players' types: "Dominant" types have...

Text mining is an active field of statistical research. In this paper we use two methods from text mining: the Poisson Reduced Rank Model (PRR, see Jentsch et al. 2020; Jentsch et al. 2021) and the Latent Dirichlet Allocation model (LDA, see Blei et al. 2003) for the statistical analysis of party...

In a Nash equilibrium of voluntary participation games in international environmental agreements, the optimal surplus sharing rules, proposed by Eyckmans and Finus (2004) and Weikard (2009), incentivize more countries to participate in the agreements. We examine how robust this desirability of...