We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is...

We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoner's dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in...

In a multilateral bargaining problem with one buyer and two heterogeneous sellers owning perfectly complementary units, we find that there exists an equilibrium which leads to inefficient delays when the buyer negotiates with the higher-valuation seller first and where players are extremely...

We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the...

We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles and binary games of complete information. We provide conditions under which we can recover both the interaction effects and the distributions of potentially correlated unobservables across goods in...

We analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers. Binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. In contrast to preexisting literature, we do not normalize the parties' reservation utilities to...

In a complete information setting we show that the standard lottery–in which each lottery ticket is offered for the same price–is an optimal fundraising mechanism in the presence of strong asymmetries in the way bettors value the prize and the public good provided with the lottery proceeds....

We show that the result on the existence of a unique Nash perfect equilibrium in two-bidder multi-unit sequential second-price auctions under complete information (as in Krishna, 1993; Katzman, 1999; and Gale and Stegeman, 2001) is not robust in higher dimensional auctions. Using an example featuring...

We embed a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility, a marriage market, into a random search model. We study steadystate equilibria and characterize the limit of the corresponding equilibrium matchings as exogenous search frictions become small. The central question is whether the...

Econometric models under complete information environment with game theoretic foundations are used in this work to analyze husband and wife labor force participation in Mexico. A mechanism of equilibrium's selection was designed in the context of multiple equilibria, in order to identify the...

We analyze sequential second-price auctions under complete information involving two or more bidders with similar decreasing marginal valuations. Krishna (1999) designed a 2-bidder numerical example to show the existence of two symmetric equilibria characterized by an asymmetric allocation and...

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social...

Including the entry decision in a Bertrand model with imperfectly informed consumers, we introduce a trade-off at the level of social welfare. On the one hand, market transparency is benefi cial when the number of firms is exogenously given. On the other, a higher degree of market transparency...

Global games are widely used for equilibrium selection to predict behaviour in complete information games with strategic complementarities. We establish two results on the global game selection. First, we show that it is independent of the payoff functions of the global game embedding, though it...