In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of the class of weighted division values. Firstly, while keeping efficiency, additivity and the nullifying player property from the original axiomatization of the equal division value, we consider relaxations of symmetry in line with Casajus (2019)...

This paper studies fishery strategies in lakes, seas, and shallow rivers subject to agricultural and industrial pollution. The flowing pollutants are modeled by a nonlinear differential equation in a general manner. The logistic growth model for the fish population is modified to cover the...

Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of...

Several models of social preferences have been developed at the intersection of social psychology and behavioral economics, such as social value orientation (SVO) and conditional cooperation. Whereas SVO is well researched in its dispositional and situational correlates, we aim to locate...

This paper studies a simple process of demand adjustment in cooperative games. In the process, a randomly chosen player makes the highest possible demand subject to the demands of other coalition members being satisfied. This process converges to the aspiration set; in convex games, this implies...

This paper analyzes the allocation of the total toll collected in a highway among its segments. Based on different toll charging rules, we propose the Segments Equal Sharing method, the Exits Equal Sharing method, and the Entrances Equal Sharing method. We provide axioms and characterize these...

Cooperative games with a permission structure are useful tools for analyzing the impact of hierarchical structures on allocation problems in Economics and Operations Research. In this paper, we propose a generalization of the local disjunctive and the local conjunctive permission approaches...

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity) using the paradigm of dynamic programming. Starting from the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and...

In the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value of a non-convex cooperative game, we derive a procedure to find out a convex game in which the Egalitarian Allocation is a coalitional rational value. The procedure depends on the relationship between two parameters called the Convexity Threshold...

Shapley value theory, which originally emerged from cooperative game theory, was established for the purpose of measuring the exact contribution of agents playing the game. Subsequently, the Shapley value was used in finance to decompose the risk of optimal portfolios, attributing to the various...

We develop a model of a cooperative power game between a chief executive officer (CEO) and labor over a proposed corporate outsourcing, and test the model’s predictions concerning the decision to outsource, division of profits, and post-outsourcing firm performance using a sample of...

Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions. Intergroup competitions provide a different hypothesis that is intuitively appealing but heterodox. We show that neither mechanism reliably supports the evolution of cooperation...

Why does human cooperation often unravel in economic experiments despite a promising start? Previous studies have interpreted the decline as the reaction of disappointed cooperators retaliating in response to lesser cooperators (conditional cooperation). This interpretation has been considered...

We experimentally examine how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma affects conditional cooperation. In our first study we conduct online experiments in which subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma games with payoffs systematically varied across games. We find that few second...

We investigate in a laboratory setting whether revealing information on the intelligence of both players affects behavior in repeated games. We study the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) and Battle of Sexes (BoS) as they cover a large set of the interesting scenarios generated by repeated games of two...

Contribution rate evaluation plays a key role in new weapon or equipment development project demonstration, since the priority of potentially developed weapon depends on the contribution of weapons and equipment to the effectiveness of the Combat System of Systems (CSoS). However, previous...

This study employs a finitely repeated binary investment (trust) experiment to examine the exogenous gradualism mechanism-increasing the investment stake slowly rather than imposing a high stake immediately-in trustor-trustee cooperation building. We propose a behavioral model with reciprocal...

We introduce the Maschler-Perles-Shapley value for NTU games composed by smooth bodies. This waywe extend the M-P-S value established for games composed by Cephoids ("sums of deGua Simplices"). The development is parallel to the one of the (generalized) Maschler-Perles bargaining solution. For...

We experimentally examine how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma affects conditional cooperation. In our first study we conduct online experiments in which subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma games with payoffs systematically varied across games. We find that few second...

When people coordinate in one-shot, pure coordination games they rely on existing concepts of salience. In an experiment with pure coordination games, concepts of salience emerged when players were given a set of different but related coordination problems with randomly generated labels. The...

In a cooperative game with communication structure a graph describes the communication possibilities of the players, which are represented by the nodes. We introduce a variation of this model by assuming that each edge in the communication graph represents an agent. These agents simply act as...

Abstract: The Japanese government intends to discharge radioactive nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear reactor into the Pacific Ocean, which will cause catastrophic and irreversible pollution of the ocean ecology. The international community has expressed strong opposition in response...

We consider a Prisoner’s Dilemma model with a pre-play communication stage. Players get a disutility from deceiving others after sending a message of conditional cooperation. Each player’s realized lying aversion cost is private information. We prove existence and characterize the (unique)...

We examine how conditional cooperation is related to the material payoffs in a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma experiment. We have subjects play eight SPDs with varying payoffs, systematically varying the material gain to the second-mover and the material loss to the first-mover when the...

A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes the way to efficiently connect agents to a source when they are located at different places. Once the efficient tree is obtained, the total cost should be allocated among the involved agents in a fair and stable manner. It is well known that there...