Using creditor litigation data from China, we investigate whether creditors can participate in corporate governance when agency conflict between shareholders and creditors is severe. By comparing firms that have experienced creditor lawsuits (litigation firms) with those that have not...

This paper documents that resource reallocation across firms is an important mechanism through which creditor rights affect real outcomes. I exploit the staggered adoption of an international convention that provides globally consistent strong creditor protection for aircraft finance. After this...

Agency problem between shareholders and creditors can be reduced by two mechanisms namely reputation-building and debt covenant. Prior studies document supporting evidence for both hypotheses with a positive relationship between creditor rights and dividend policy. However, they fail to test...

This paper contrasts the recent European initiatives on regulating corporate groups with alternative approaches to the phenomenon. In doing so it pays particular regard to the German codified law on corporate groups as the polar opposite to the piecemeal approach favored by E.U. legislation. It...

I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to...

An insolvency administrator replaces the manager of an insolvent firm to devise and organize a liquidation or reorganization plan in the creditors’ interest. In the course of the process, the insolvency administrator presents the most favourable option from his perspective, and the creditors...