We rationalize exclusive portfolio dealing in a novel three-period partial equilibrium framework populated by a representative, risk-neutral seller and a small number of ex ante identical broker-dealers. Endowed with independent, uncertain demand for a representative asset, the broker-dealers...

We rationalize exclusive portfolio dealing in a novel three-period partial equilibrium framework populated by a representative, risk-neutral seller and a small number of ex ante identical broker-dealers. Endowed with independent, uncertain demand for a representative asset, the broker-dealers...

We review the Chicago school's single monopoly profit theory whereby an upstream monopolist cannot increase its profits through vertical integration as it has sufficient market power anyways. In our model the dominant supplier has full bargaining power and uses observable two-part tariffs. We...

This study constructs a successive Cournot model to investigate the possibility that a separated upstream input supplier can solely sell the intermediate good to a separated downstream manufacturer through an exclusive contract in the presence of a vertically integrated rival. We find that the...

We investigate the effects of buyer heterogeneity in a market where an incumbent firm prevents entry when it signs enough exclusionary contracts with buyers. With heterogeneous buyers, several well-known results in exclusionary contracting with homogenous buyers are overturned and novel ones...

This study constructs a successive Cournot model to investigate the possibility that a separated upstream input supplier can solely sell the intermediate good to a separated downstream manufacturer through an exclusive contract in the presence of a vertically integrated rival. We find that the...

In this paper, we demonstrate that the anticompetitive effect of exclusive contractingon market entry can be completely nullified if the entrant is allowedto sell partial cross ownership (PCO) to the incumbent. In equilibrium theincumbent is fully compensated and efficient entry occurs; thus PCO...

This paper studies asymmetric platforms' incentives for enforcing exclusivity on multihoming sellers. We show that exclusivity benefits a platform only when its service is not very valuable to sellers, and hence can be initiated by a weak platform rather than the stronger one. It is possible for...

An incumbent supplier can use exclusive dealing contracts with buyers to prevent entry of an efficient rival when those contracts include an agreement over price. The linear price in the unique exclusionary equilibrium is above (below) the incumbent’s variable cost when buyers compete over...

We present a theory of anticompetitive exclusive dealing. In it, exclusive deals do not serve to disadvantage rivals or exclude them from the market. In equilibrium, it is often the case that multiple suppliers each form their own exclusive networks, with some downstream firms remaining...

We utilize a novel identification strategy to analyze the impact of assets in place on firms' decisions for future projects. We exploit the context in the pharmaceutical industry, where the loss of market exclusivity for a branded drug can be used to separate the impact of cash flows generated...

We consider exclusive contracts as a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer's entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the...

We construct a two-period model of the supply chain's openness in a durable goods market by introducing two marketing modes: leasing and selling. Given a marketing mode, at the beginning of the first period, an incumbent supplier and the downstream monopolist choose one of the trading modes: (i)...

We review the Chicago school's single monopoly profit theory whereby an upstream monopolist cannot increase its profits through vertical integration as it has sufficient market power anyways. In our model the dominant supplier has full bargaining power and uses observable two-part tariffs. We...

In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing...

We develop a unified theory of exclusive dealing and exclusionary bundling. In a framework with two competing manufacturers which supply their product(s) through a monopolist retailer, we show that buyer power restores the profitability of such practices involving inefficient exclusion. The...

We consider exclusive contracts as a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer’s entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the...

We construct a two-period model of the supply chain's openness in a durable goods market by introducing two marketing modes: leasing and selling. Given a marketing mode, at the beginning of the first period, an incumbent supplier and the downstream monopolist choose one of the trading modes: (i)...

This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade...

this paper examines interbrand competition between a domestic and a foreign manufacturer who market their products through intermediaries. the contracts manufacturers offer these intermediaries are endogenous. in equilibrium contracts may specify exclusive territories (et), depending on the...

The topic of vertical restraints has generated a good deal of interest, discussion, and controversy in recent years. Moreover, the recent publication of the US Justice Department's 'Vertical Restraints Guidelines' ensures that the subject will continue to be discussed, both in the US and in...

We utilize a novel identification strategy to analyze the impact of assets in place on firms' decisions for future projects. We exploit the context in the pharmaceutical industry, where the loss of market exclusivity for a branded drug can be used to separate the impact of cash flows generated...

This study investigates the role of exclusive content provision in two-sided markets where both sides are allowed to join multiple platforms. We consider a model of duopolistic two-sided platform market with a monopolistic multi-product (content) firm on one side, and consumers on the other. The...

A large proportion of our online activity takes place through a handful of platforms. With increased hostility towards the prevalence of vertical integration in tech markets and calls for the breaking up of profitable technology companies such as Amazon, Apple, Google and Microsoft, the time is...

We utilize a novel identification strategy to analyze the impact of assets in place on firms' decisions for future projects. We exploit the context in the pharmaceutical industry, where the loss of market exclusivity for a branded drug can be used to separate the impact of cash flows generated...

This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent...

This article studies incentives for a premium provider (Superstar) to offer exclusive contracts to competing platforms mediating the interactions between consumers and firms. When platform competition is intense, more consumers subscribe to the platform hosting the Superstar exclusively. This...

We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (manufacturers)that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties....