Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility...

We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that TTC is the only rule that is strategyproof and individually-rational. We hence relax this constraint and consider pair-efficiency. A...

I suggest that the aggregate implications of indivisible labor are few, and subtle. First, I model behavior in an 'indivisible labor' environment like those of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986), Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and show that aggregate behavior in...

We identify a natural counterpart of the standard GARP for demand data in which goods are all indivisible. We show that the new axiom (DARP, for “discrete axiom of revealed preference”) is necessary and sufficient for the rationalization of the data by a well-behaved utility function. Our...

The study of matching theory has gained importance recently with applications in Kidney Exchange, House Allocation, School Choice etc. The general theme of these problems is to allocate goods in a fair manner amongst participating agents. The agents generally have a unit supply/demand of a good...

For the classic problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods, we introduce the notion of minimum social inequality allocations and discuss its connection to other fair allocation rules such as minimum envy. We show that a fair allocation problem can always be cast as the problem of finding an...

There are several locations, each of which is endowed with a resource that is specific to that location. Examples include coastal fisheries, oil fields, etc. Each agent will go to a single location and harvest some of the resource there. Several agents may go to each location. We assign...

Some consumption opportunities, e.g. medical treatments, are both indivisible and only valuable in particular states of nature. The existence of such state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunities influences a person's risk attitudes. In general, people are not risk averse anymore even if...

Abstract: Disequilibrium trade can occur in a market lacking both recontracting options and a computational system that maps utilities into prices. This paper studies disequilibrium trade in a large market for an indivisible good. We focus on two issues: the speed of adjustment when arbitrage...

We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts

We study an endowment economy with heterogeneous agents and two complementary consumption goods, one of which is indivisible. Although agents have standard concave preferences, the indivisibility gives rise to Friedman-Savage convexity in indirect utility. Agents care about relative, not just...

Some consumption opportunities are both indivisible and only valuable in particular tates of nature. The existence of such state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunities influences a person’s risk attitudes. In general, people are not risk averse anymore even if utility from divisible...

An Equivalence Theorem between geometric structures and utility functions allows new methods for understanding preferences. Our classification of valuations into "Demand Types" incorporates existing definitions (substitutes, complements, "strong substitutes", etc.) and permits new ones. Our...

We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is anonymity. The standard definition requires that if agents' names are permuted, their assignments should be permuted in the same way. Since no rule satisfies this definition in...