Competition authorities increasingly rely on economic screening tools to identify markets where firms deviate from competitive norms. Traditional screening methods assume that collusion occurs through secret agreements. However, recent research highlights that firms can use public announcements...

Utilizing Connor's International Cartel Database and employing difference-in-differences methodology, we find that market concentration, the number of buyers and cartel duration have significant impacts on cartel overcharges. We also find that the European Commission's 2006 guidelines on the...

There are many evidences which prove that cartels’ price leads to an economic inefficiency, due to the reduced consumers welfare. Antitrust authorities have set up different ways to defeat and prevent collusive agreements, but as widely showed by the literature, deterring collusion may have...

The Illumina/Grail case, which significantly rejected the EU Commission's wide interpretation of its powers of accepting a referral of a merger that did not meet the national merger control thresholds of the referring Member State, introduced changes in the EU about concentrations (Article 22 of...

This paper examines how the Brazilian ready-mix concrete cartel expanded through mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, we investigate whether cartel firms strategically acquired non-aligned competitors to optimize market dominance, eliminate competition and sustain collusive behavior.Using...

We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows a firm to be collusive when facing members of its cartel yet competitive when facing others. Intuitively, as initial bids are shaded, close initial bids not only imply similar costs but also provide an...

Sellers face a critical choice: run competitive auctions or strike exclusive deals with preferred buyers. Contrary to conventional wisdom that sellers should rely on open competition, we show that a powerful seller optimally commits to a sequential `flexclusivity' arrangement - a strategic mix...

This study constructs a model of exclusive-offer competition between two existing up-stream firms. Under exclusive-offer competition, the upstream firm's profit depends on the rival's exclusive offer. If the rival makes an exclusive offer acceptable for the downstream firm, the upstream firm is...

We experimentally investigate exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. In theory, when upstream firms make exclusive offers to a downstream monopolist, both exclusion and non-exclusion can be equilibrium outcomes. By varying key parameters, we explore how bargaining power...

The regulatory shift by competition and antitrust authorities, allowing limited industry collusion in sustainability-related investments to align markets with broader environmental and social objectives, suggests a re-evaluation of competition as a mechanism for promoting collective welfare....

We develop a tractable model of competitive price cycles where prices are chosen alternatingly and consumers have heterogenous information. The model yields sharp empirical predictions about price patterns, impact of captive consumers and pass-through. Using rich station-level price data from...

Competition authorities increasingly rely on economic screening tools to identify markets where firms deviate from competitive norms. Traditional screening methods assume that collusion occurs through secret agreements. However, recent research highlights that firms can use public announcements...

We present a simple model where, before competing in prices, firms announce which prices they intend to choose. Deviating from these announcements involves a cost. We show that sharing pricing intentions results in prices being set above their competitive levels. All equilibria result in prices...

Using a sample of listed Chinese firms from 2007 to 2020, we investigate the governance implications of cross-ownership in corporate bond markets. We find that cross-ownership significantly reduces bond issuance spreads, suggesting that synergistic governance effects outweigh potential collusion...

This paper explores algorithmic collusion from both legal and economic perspectives, underscoring the increasing influence of algorithms in firms’ market decisions and their potential to facilitate anti-competitive behaviour. By employing bandit algorithms as a model—typically used in...

Competition authorities increasingly rely on economic screening tools to identify markets where firms deviate from competitive norms. Traditional screening methods assume that collusion occurs through secret agreements. However, recent research highlights that firms can use public announcements...

Purpose - Using Chinese A-share listed firms between 2007 and 2020 with 21,380 observations, we aim to examine the impact of cross-ownership on firms' innovation output and explore the underlying mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach - To test the influence of cross-ownership on firms'...

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of private and unilateral disclosure of sensitive information in a sequential bargaining context. We consider a model where two sellers each propose a take-it-or-leave-it price for a homogeneous good to a single buyer. The buyer accepts or rejects the...

We study the propensity of independent algorithms to collude in repeated Cournot duopoly games. Specifically, we investigate the predictive power of different oligopoly and bargaining solutions regarding the effect of asymmetry between firms. We find that both consumers and firms can benefit...

Competition authorities impose substantial penalties on firms engaging in illegal pricefixing. We examine how basing cartel fines on either revenue, profit, or price overcharge influences cartel and market prices, as well as cartel incidence and stability. In an infinitely repeated Bertrand...

We show that MRPM can increase manufacturer profits and total output even in the absence of traditional justifications based on point-of-sale services, retailer effort, or free-riding. The key insight is that MRPM mitigates channel conflict by altering how retailers balance extracting surplus...