This paper establishes a new fact about immigration policies: legalization has long-term effects on formal employment of undocumented immigrants and their assimilation. We exploit the broad amnesty enacted in Italy in 2002 together with rich survey data collected in 2011 on a representative...

Cartels are often fought by granting leniency, in the form of forgiveness of penalties, to whistle-blowers. This study employs a laboratory experiment to compare leniency programs that differ with respect to fine size and whether a second whistle-blower may apply for leniency. The results show...

We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in the EU. We document a recent phenomenon that we name EU ``leniency inflation", whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many, and sometimes all members of a cartel. We argue that, coupled...

Exploiting unique datasets covering over 28,000 tax evaders in the Netherlands, we investigate the distribution of tax evasion and its implications for the measurement of wealth inequality. In contrast to Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2019), the correction for offshore wealth has only a...

This report discusses cash bail reforms that have occurred in the United States and provides key considerations for people interested in implementing bail reforms in their jurisdiction. Based on a landscape analysis of bail reforms across all 50 states, we identify the four main actors who take...

The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel,...

Discussions on personal bankruptcy regulations are usually focused on the controversial effects of leniency on society, economy, financial markets, entrepreneurship, and labour supply. However, the methodology of measuring leniency has been limited to one-time legislative changes or some...

The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel,...

This paper analyzes the effect of family ownership on a company’s tax avoidance practices in Indonesia. This study also analyzes whether there is a change in tax avoidance practice after the tax amnesty program implemented in 2015-2016. We used three measurements to capture tax avoidance...

Rebel groups that govern territory require the support of large numbers of civilians. Afterconflict ends, these civilians are often perceived as rebel collaborators. Yet, we know relatively little about what victimized populations think is the appropriate response to collaborators. This gap in...

The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel,...

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against...

To protect investors, regulators increasingly rely on regulating firms' internal controls over financial reporting, but they punish noncompliance only if an internal control weakness enabled accounting manipulation. In other words, enforcement is manipulation-contingent. We develop an economic...

Exploiting unique datasets covering over 28,000 tax evaders in the Netherlands, we investigate the distribution of tax evasion and its implications for the measurement of wealth inequality. In contrast to Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2019), the correction for offshore wealth has only a...

Cartels can severely harm social welfare. Competition authorities introduced leniency rules to destabilize existing cartels and hinder the formation of new ones. Empirically, it is difficult to judge the success of these measures because functioning cartels are unobservable. Existing...

The European Commission introduced in its 2006 revision of the Leniency programme the concept of ‘marker' which is a temporary protection for potential leniency applicants while they prepare a full leniency application. The object of the marker is to grant companies some predictability on the...

This article aims to analyze the views on tax amnesty from various parties, namely state officials, tax officials, taxpayers, and tax consultants. Their views are explored through qualitative research methods. The selected informants included four tax officials, two taxpayers, tax consultants,...

The literature on cartel stability sidelines antitrust policy, whereas the literature on antitrust policy tends to neglect issues of cartel stability. This paper attempts to connect these two interrelated aspects in the context of an augmented quantity leadership model. The cartel is the...

Cartels can severely harm social welfare. Competition authorities introduced leniency rules to destabilize existing cartels and hinder the formation of new ones. Empirically, it is difficult to judge the success of these measures because functioning cartels are unobservable. Existing...

In a cross-country study, we investigate how staggered passage of national leniency programs from 1990-2012 has affected firms' margins and merger activity. We find that these programs, which give amnesty to cartel conspirators that cooperate with antitrust authorities, reduced the gross margins...

The cartel leniency programs developed in the U.S. and in other jurisdictions around the world have been considered remarkably successful. A critical look at leniency programs, however, should give some pause, especially as leniency programs proliferate around the globe. First, the powerful...

Early Spanish anti-slave trade discourses, 1802-1814 -- Defining a new discourse on the slave trade: absolutist nuances, Toreno's commitment, and Varela's utopia -- Abolitionism, exile, and the "necessary evil" argument, 1823-1835 -- Political exclusion, racism, and abolitionism in the 1840s --...

There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collusion. To examine this concern, we exploit the fact that leniency programs (LPs) are generally recognized as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements and study the effect that the introduction of...

This comment is submitted in response to the Dominican Republic National Commission for the Defense of Competition's (“Procompetencia”) public consultation on the Proposed Regulation for the Establishment of a System for Reduction of Sanctions for Cooperation in Cartel Investigations. The...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...

This paper analyzes the effect of lifting primary school fees on educational attainment in Uganda. After the abolishment of school fees in 1997, the enrollment rate more than doubled. Two decades later, however, we know little about the effect of the policy on educational attainment. With recent...

Wage gaps between documented (including natives) and undocumented workers may reflect employer exploitation, endogenous occupational sorting and productivity losses associated with lack of legal status. Identification of the undocumented productivity penalty is crucial to estimate the aggregate...

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...