I investigate the interaction between a country that imports a commodity whose production contributes to a stock pollution, such as electricity, from a country that produces that commodity. If the transboundary externality is priced improperly, the application of a feed-in tariff or border tax...

I investigate the interaction between a country that imports a commodity whose production contributes to a stock pollution, such as electricity, from a country that produces that commodity. If the transboundary externality is priced improperly, the application of a feed-in tariff or border tax...

The purpose of this paper is to examine dynamic interdependence between wealth accumulation, capital accumulation, economic structure, domestic and global division of labor, international trade and environmental change with transboundary pollution. It analyzes not only inequalities in income,...

The authors consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a firm in each country. Firms produce the same good by means of a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these firms can adopt clean technology which uses renewable energy, having lower costs. Interestingly,...

In this paper I explore a model where citizens of a country vulnerable to damages from climate change may migrate to a second country, from which a steady stream of greenhouse gases occur. If this migration imposes costs on the emitting country, then migration induces a sort of pseudo carbon...

Consider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types...

In this paper I explore a model where citizens of a country vulnerable to damages from climate change may migrate to a second country, from which a steady stream of greenhouse gases occur. If this migration imposes costs on the emitting country, then migration induces a sort of pseudo carbon...

Consider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types...

The authors consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a firm in each country. Firms produce the same good by means of a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these firms can adopt a clean technology which uses a renewable energy having a lower unit cost....

This book explains why the concept of sustainable development needs to be consigned to history. Using examples from around the world, Richard Pagett illustrates how so-called sustainable development has simply been a cul-de-sac, condemning millions to continuing extreme poverty. Building Global...

The present study explores the strategic interactions of countries setting pollution abatement policies in a dynamic two-player game. To reach a common target of environmental quality, countries can choose to commit to a stream of pollution abate- ment right from the beginning of the game or...

The authors consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a firm in each country. Firms produce the same good by means of a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these firms can adopt clean technology which uses renewable energy, having lower costs. Interestingly,...

The purpose of this paper is to examine dynamic interdependence between wealth accumulation, capital accumulation, economic structure, domestic and global division of labor, international trade and environmental change with transboundary pollution. It analyzes not only inequalities in income,...

The purpose of this paper is to examine dynamic interdependence between wealth accumulation, capital accumulation, economic structure, domestic and global division of labor, international trade and environmental change with transboundary pollution. It analyzes not only inequalities in income,...

The authors consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a firm in each country. Firms produce the same good by means of a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these firms can adopt clean technology which uses renewable energy, having lower costs. Interestingly,...

In this paper, we study the effects of absorptive capacity and R&D spillovers on cross -border pollution in a game played by two regulator-firm hierarchies. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution, a subsidy per- unit of original research and a subsidy per-unit of absorptive research, the...

We consider the effect of an increase in the risk from pollution. We show that in the case of a flow pollution, when the number of players is sufficiently large, the result of Bramoulle and Treich [<italic>Journal of the European Economic Association</italic>, 2009], showing that a marginal increase of risk in...

The authors consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a firm in each country. Firms produce the same good by means of a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these firms can adopt a clean technology which uses a renewable energy having a lower unit cost....

In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game model composed by two regulator-firm hierarchies. By means of adequate emission taxes, original and absorptive research and development (R&D) subsidies we prove that regulators can reach the non-cooperative social...

The authors consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a firm in each country. Firms produce the same good by means of a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these firms can adopt a clean technology which uses a renewable energy having a lower unit cost....

In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game model composed by two regulator-firm hierarchies. By means of adequate emission taxes, original and absorptive research and development (R&D) subsidies we prove that regulators can reach the non-cooperative social...

We incorporate matching schemes into a model of transboundary environmental agreements and investigate their effectiveness using three-stage game models. In the first stage, each country decides whether to accede to the agreement. In the second stage, the signatories collectively choose a common...

We consider a game of abatement of a transboundary pollutant. We use a time-consistent Shapley value allocation of the cost of pollution reduction, and study the sensitivity of such an allocation to countries' adaptation to pollution. A country's adaptation to pollution is captured by a change...

This paper considers the impact of differences in endogenous technological change between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic interaction in environmental policies. First, we demonstrate that an environmentally lagging country's technology may continue to...

Current day large animal facilities generate more manure than they need on their own feed production areas. Excessive nutrient applications deteriorate groundwater (nitrogen) and surface water quality (nitrogen and/or phosphorus). Due to differences in environmental and economic characteristics,...

Производственная сфера основной источник загрязнения окружающей среды (в том числе и трансграничного). Осуществить экологизацию производственной сферы...

Проблема трансграничного загрязнения носит межрегиональный, и часто, международный характер. Основная сложность ее решения состоит в определении четкой,...

We consider the effect of an increase in the risk from pollution. We show that in the case of a flow pollution, when the number of players is sufficiently large, the result of Bramoulle and Treich, showing that a marginal increase of risk in the neighborhood of a risk-free world is...

As an agreement on an international climate treaty appears out of sight in the short run, many countries rely on unilateral greenhouse gas abatement strategies. The reach of such unilateral policies can be extended beyond the borders of the abating country by a switch to a consumption-based...

In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game model composed by two regulator-firm hierarchies. By means of adequate emission taxes, original and absorptive research and development (R&D) subsidies we prove that regulators can reach the non-cooperative social...