The purpose of this paper is to identify learning in games in experimental economic settings, and apply their results to real multilateral trade negotiations, such as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in the World Trade Organizations (WTO). This paper argues that the structure of games including...

Using data from a laboratory-controlled environment we analyze the decisions of principals to veto the allocations of grossed-up investments proposed by their agents in a modified trust game. We also analyze the changes in the surplus associated with the introduction of empowerment and the...

A group of agents wants to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We analyze a simple voting system - majority rule...

A group of agents wants to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We analyze a simple voting system - majority rule...

In a laboratory-controlled environment we provide experimental evidence on the effects of transparency (complete over incomplete information) and empowerment on trust (investment by a principal) and trustworthiness (reciprocal behavior of an agent). We implement a simple two-person investment...

The funding of social protection has strongly evolved in Bismarckian countries : whereas social protection used to rely on social contributions, since the 1990s most of the new expenditures have been funded through taxation, leading to a more balanced mix in the structure of social protection...

The funding of social protection has strongly evolved in Bismarckian countries : whereas social protection used to rely on social contributions, since the 1990s most of the new expenditures have been funded through taxation, leading to a more balanced mix in the structure of social protection...

The funding of social protection has strongly evolved in Bismarckian countries : whereas social protection used to rely on social contributions, since the 1990s most of the new expenditures have been funded through taxation, leading to a more balanced mix in the structure of social protection...

In a laboratory-controlled environment characterized by uncertainty and incomplete information we provide experimental evidence on the effects of transparency and empowerment on trust (investment by a principal) and trustworthiness (reciprocal behavior of an agent) in a simple two-person...

We extend the property-rights framework to allow for: a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto; and sequential investment. Parties investing first (ex ante) do so before contracting is possible. Parties that invest second (ex post) can contract on (at least some) of their...

The issue of veto may play an important role in an approval situation, mainly in political science, where several scholars dealt with this topic. In this survey we want to update the state-of-the-art, paying particular attention to the open problems that various authors pointed out in their...

This paper provides a theory of earmarking based on the relative power of a legislature and executive. The politically powerful use earmarking as a means of resolving uncertainty and insulating preferred policy from the reach of future government. Tax revenue will be earmarked more often when...

The consequences of consolidating EU representation at the IMF Executive Board by regrouping the 27 Member States into two EU constituencies, euro area and non-euro area, are discussed. In particular we contrast voting power as proposed by Penrose-Banzhaf (PBI) and Shapley-Shubik (SSI), and...

This paper uses laboratory mechanism design in an investment environment to examine the impact of empowering investors with the right to veto the investee’s profit distribution decision on the level of trust and trustworthiness. One of the key findings is that the empowerment of investors...

The consequences of consolidating EU representation at the IMF Executive Board by regrouping the 27 Member States into two EU constituencies, euro area and non-euro area, are discussed. In particular we contrast voting power as proposed by Penrose-Banzhaf (PBI) and Shapley-Shubik (SSI), and...

In the property rights theory of the firm, control over assets (ownership) affords bargaining power in the case of re-negotiation, providing incentives for parties to make relationship specific investments. The models predict that property rights will be allocated so as to maximise surplus...

This paper uses a controlled laboratory environment and a two-person investment game in a multi-period setting to examine the impact of empowering investors with the right to veto the investee’s profit distribution on trust and trustworthiness. Two forms of vetoes are tested: the first is...

This paper aims to derive policy implications for real trade negotiations from experiments on multilateral legislative bargaining games. The experiment results reveal that the existence of a strong player with veto power could delay the games. Considering the similarity between the games with...