In speedboat racing in Japan, women racers participate and compete in races under the same conditions as men, and all individuals are randomly assigned to mixed-gender or single-gender groups for each race. In this paper we use a sample of over 140,000 observations of individual-level racing...

This paper provides nested sets and vector representations of knockout tournaments. The paper introduces classification of probability domain assumptions and a new set of axioms. Two new seeding methods are proposed: equal gap seeding and increasing competitive intensity seeding. Under different...

Die Bedrohung der Integrität sportlicher Wettbewerbe durch Betrug und Manipulation gehört zu den derzeit intensiv diskutierten Themen sowohl innerhalb der Sportwissenschaft als auch in der sportinteressierten Öffentlichkeit. Dabei verdeckt der Blick auf medial transportierte Skandale...

Der (olympische) Leistungssport gilt als ideale Form der Konkurrenz, in der gemäß den Prinzipien der Fairness, Chancengleichheit, Transparenz und gegenseitigen Achtung allein die Leistung entscheiden soll. Darauf gründet ein Großteil seiner Popularität, aber auch seine Vorbildfunktion für...

This paper evaluates differential prize taxation and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the...

Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical dataon induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in acontrolled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory:effort and sabotage...

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agents effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, promo-tion tournaments and individual performance pay need to be...

In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhapswhen workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability andoutput in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect oftournaments is thin...

Teamwork and cooperation between workers can be of substantial value to a firm, yet thelevel of worker cooperation often varies between individual firms. We show that thesedifferences can be the result of labor market competition if workers have heterogeneouspreferences and preferences are...

Two very different approaches are used to explore the relation between market orientationand gender wage differentials in international data. More market orientation might be relatedto gender wage gaps via its effects on competition in product and labor markets and thegeneral absence of...

This paper provides a systematic empirical investigation of the effect of product marketliberalization on employment when there are interactions between policies and institutions inproduct and labor markets...

In this paper I contrast the impact of precision, i.e., the level of accuracy with which workers' performance is assessed, on wage costs in U- and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments prizes are fixed. In J-type tournaments only anoverall wage sum is specified. The principal can increase...

I compare an auction and a tournament in a procurement setting where a noncontractible signal about the quality that each firm is able to supply is observed by the procurer and all competing firms. Signals are affected by firms noncontractibleinvestments in R&D and the procurers precision of...

Does gender play a role in the context of team work? Our results based on areal-effort experiment suggest that performance depends on the composition of theteam. We find that female and male performance di¤er most in mixed teams withrevenue sharing between the team members, as men put in...

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly.

In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who deter-mine reward allocation. Labor-union members bargain over wage dis-tribution, and many …firms allow self-managed teams to freely determineinternal resource allocation, incentive structure, and division of labour.We analyze, and test...