Ngangoué and Schotter (2023) investigate common-probability auctions. By running an experiment, they find that, in contrast to the substantial overbidding found in common-value auctions, bidding in strategically equivalent common-probability auctions is consistent with the Nash equilibrium. We...

In the context of supply function competition with private information, we test in the laboratory whether - as predicted in Bayesian equilibrium - costs that are positively correlated lead to steeper supply functions and less competitive outcomes than do uncorrelated costs. We find that the...

In the context of supply function competition with private information, we test in the laboratory whether, as predicted in Bayesian equilibrium, costs that are positively correlated lead to steeper supply functions and less competitive outcomes than do uncorrelated costs. We find that the...

In the context of supply function competition with private information, we test in the laboratory whether — as predicted in Bayesian equilibrium — costs that are positively correlated lead to steeper supply functions and less competitive outcomes than do uncorrelated costs. We find that the...

We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegationframework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself andmust choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. Inthe focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating...

This paper explores the use of auctions for privatizing public assets. In our model, a single insider bidder (e.g., incumbent management of a government-owned firm) possesses information about the asset's risky value. In addition, bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting...