We study how privacy regulations impact information transmission. A receiver faces a decision whose payoff depends on an unknown state. A platform sends a message to her given a sensitive and a nonsensitive signal. Privacy loss occurs when the receiver updates about the former. When privacy is...

In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a...

We study project selection and development by a principal, interacting with two agents each of whom wants their respective project selected. When the best choice is uncertain, keeping both projects alive gives the principal the ability to adapt its choice in the future, but implies an efficiency...

How best to incentivise disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover...

We study "willful ignorance" - choosing not to learn whether a task is illegal - in a lawmaker-principal-agent game and characterize the penalty policies that implement welfare-maximizing behavior. The model delivers an implementability frontier : which equilibrium behaviors can exist and be...

Priority-based allocation often requires eliminating justified envy, making serial dictatorship (SD) the only non-wasteful direct mechanism with that property. However, SD's outcomes can conflict with the policymaker's objectives. We introduce visible fairness, a framework where fairness is...

Ensuring incentive compatibility mechanisms to enforce market obligations is crucial in deploying a transactive energy system. While previous studies have reported adopting penalty mechanisms for market compliance, these studies did not generally analyse the incentive compatibility property of...

This paper examines the welfare implications of priority service in a frictional search environment with heterogeneous outside options. Priority search facilitates expedited matching with public options in the market by charging a service premium. Our main analysis demonstrates that a...

We present an experimental study of decentralized two‐sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary nonbinding match offers that get finalized when a period of market inactivity has elapsed. Several insights...

We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a...

In the past two decades, the design and implementation of living donor kidney exchange clearinghouses have been a major success story in market design. Instead of batching and optimizing exchanges over a fixed pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs, the busiest programs now operate...

We study the design of efficient mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. Assuming quasi-linear utilities and private values, we show that we can implement in conditional dominant strategies a social...

I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long‐lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when...

We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...

We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...

This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of students under two school admission procedures commonly used in the US, the EU, and other jurisdictions: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information...

We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receivers inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement...

We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without additional incentives. We propose the use of a wait time auction, where individuals bid the...

We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents who have to be assigned items at each date. When the social planner can only elicit ordinal agents' preferences, we prove that under a mild regularity assumption, incentive compatible and...