Deviations from equilibrium predictions in one-shot games are common in experiments, and various models have been proposed to capture the behavior of boundedlyrational players in games. While the Quantal Response Equilibrium model allows players to better respond to correct beliefs, in the model...

Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2013) introduced generalized extensive-form games that allow for asymmetric unawareness. Here, we study the normal form of a generalized extensiveform game. The generalized normal-form game associated to a generalized extensive-form game with unawareness may consist...

Chapter 1. Operations Management: A Curtain Raiser -- Chapter 2. Game Theory: Primitives and Representations -- Chapter 3. Games in Normal Form -- Chapter 4. Games in Normal Form: Applications in OM -- Chapter 5. Games in Extensive Form -- Chapter 6. Games in Extensive Form: Applications in OM...

This study examines how each player chooses her/his optimal action in "normal-form games with unawareness" by applying a "discovery process" to them. We show that if each player implements a best response to the opponents' immediately preceding plays, then any discovery process converges to a...

This paper develops a framework for estimating Quantal Response Equilibrium models from experimental data using Bayesian techniques. Bayesian techniques offer some advantages over the more commonly-used maximum likelihood approach: (i) the accuracy of the posterior simulation is limited by...

We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no information about the...

Game-theoretic models of learning are hard to study even in the laboratory setting due to econometric and practical concerns (like the limited length of an experimental session).In particular, as the simulations by (Salmon, 2001) show, in a cross-model (or "blind'') testing of several models,...

This note investigates a set of dynamic versions of the level-k (LK) and cognitive hierarchy (CH) models in repeated normal-form games. Conventional LK and CH models assume a reasoning process that does not allow learning. This can be a restrictive assumption: When facing a repeated game,...

This paper studies the reinforcement learning of Erev and Roth with foregone payoff information in normal form games: players observe not only the realised payoffs but also foregone payoffs, the ones which they could have obtained if they had chosen the other actions. We provide conditions under...

We use machine learning to uncover regularities in the initial play of matrix games. We first train a prediction algorithm on data from past experiments. Examining the games where our algorithm predicts correctly, but existing economic models don't, leads us to add a parameter to the best...

The problem of the existence of Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii in normal-form finite games in pure and in mixed strategies is studied. The example of a three-player game that has Berge equilibrium neither in pure, nor in mixed strategies is given.

A game of love and hate is one in which a player's payoff is a function of her own action and the payoffs of other players. For each action profile, the associated payoff profile solves an interdependent utility system, and if that solution is bounded and unique for every profile we call the...

Due to the externalities, in normal form games a deviation changes the payoff of all players inducing a retaliation by the remaining or residual players. The stability of an outcome depends on the expectations potential deviators have about this reaction, but so far no satisfactory theory has...

A game of love and hate is one in which a player's payoff is a function of her own action and the payoffs of other players. For each action profile, the associated payoff profile solves an interdependent utility system, and if that solution is bounded and unique for every profile we call the...

The purpose of this study is to explore the link between imagine-self perspective-taking and rational self-interested behavior in experimental normal-form games. Drawing on the concept of sympathy developed by Adam Smith and further literature on perspective taking in games, we hypothesize that...

This paper investigates whether the strategic behavior of expected utility players differs from that of non-expected utility players in the context of incomplete information games where players can choose mixed strategies. Two conditions are identified where uncertainty-averse non-expected...

This paper investigates whether the strategic behavior of expected utility players differs from that of non-expected utility players in the context of incomplete information games where players can choose mixed strategies. Two conditions are identified where uncertainty-averse non-expected...

The assumptions that subjects hold beliefs and that the chosen actions are not altered by a proper elicitation of these beliefs are widely used in economics. In this paper I experimentally test whether the second assumption is correct. Especially controlling for different game properties, I find...

This paper describes a general framework for equilibrium selection by tracing the graph of the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) correspondence as a function of the estimation error. If a quantal response function satisfies C2 continuity, monotonicity and cumulativity, the graph of QRE...

We develop a model of crime and self-defense that provides a rationale both for the right to bear arms and for regulating this right. It also suggests that a severe punishment for gun crime might best guarantee both the security and freedom of potential victims

In this paper, we use experimental data to study players' stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and to choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days without feedback. We document a high degree of...

The purpose of this study is to explore the link between imagine-self perspective-taking and rational self-interested behavior in experimental normal-form games. Drawing on the concept of sympathy developed by Adam Smith and further literature on perspective-taking in games, we hypothesize that...

We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure, feedback about choices in the previous period and random matching, we run treatments (i) with fixed matching, (ii) without information about the...

In this paper we test the effect of descriptive “features” on initial strategic behavior in normal form games, where “descriptive” are all those features that can be modified without altering the (Nash) equilibrium structure of a game. We observe that our experimental subjects behave...

I analyze the effects of memory limitations on the endogenous learning behavior of an agent in a standard two-armed bandit problem. An infinitely lived agent chooses each period between two alternatives with unknown types, to maximize discounted payoffs. The agent can experiment with each...