We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as compromise values. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining wellspecified upper and lower bounds on payoffs. We identify subclasses of games that admit nontrivial efficient...

We continue the discussion of the taxation game following our presentation in [12]. Our concept describes a cooperative game played between a set of jurisdictions (" countries"). These players admit the operation of a multinational enterprise (MNE, the "firm") within their jurisdiction. The...

The estimation of costs allocated to each customer when serving them in a collaborative logistic operation is a complex problem whose solution is computationally very expensive. In this work the case of central horizontal collaboration for vehicle routing problems with time windows and a central...

This paper investigates forecast aggregation via the random subspace regressions method (RSM) and explores the potential link between RSM and the Shapley value decomposition (SVD) using the US GDP growth rates. This technique combination enables handling high-dimensional data and reveals the...

We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize...

Purpose - As of December 2022, there were 119,000 gas stations, 10,800 gas stations and 4,488,000 charging piles nationwide, while the number of vehicles reached 312 million, including 11.49 million new energy vehicles. The imbalance between transportation energy supply and energy replenishment...

Each value for TU-games satisfying efficiency, symmetric and linear is called an ESL value. We introduce a new value for TU-games with coalition structures, namely the Shapley-ESL value, which applies the Shapley value among coalitions and the ESL value within coalitions. Based on a new basis...

In this paper, we introduce a new class of values for cooperative games, named procedural surplus values, which is determined by procedures of sharing marginal surplus. Considering that the level of solidarity among players in a coalition may be related to the size of the coalition, this class...

A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of...

Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games, in which players are assumed to face payoff uncertainty. Characteristic functions thus assign a closed interval instead of a real number. This study revisits two interval game versions of Shapley values (i.e., the interval Shapley...

In this paper, we address the problem of fair sharing of the total value of a crowd-sourced network system between major participants (founders) and minor participants (crowd) using cooperative game theory. We use the framework of a Shapley allocation which is regarded as a fundamental method of...

This note revisits the impossibility result by Watanabe and Muto (2008), showing that almost all coalition structures cannot be at the core of patent licensing games. In contrast to their result, we demonstrate that if we only allow devia- tions under the exogenously fixed payment scheme and...

Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games in which players are assumed to face payoff uncertainty as represented by a closed interval. In this study, we examine two interval-game versions of Shapley values (i.e., the interval Shapley value and the interval Shapley-like...

We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by Casajus (Math Soc Sci 68 (2014) 1-4) via the gain-loss property (Einy and Haimanko, 2011), differential marginality and the dummy player property. We first show that differential marginality in this characterization can be weakened into...