This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value 'wallet game'. The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour:...

The n-player Tullock contest with complete information is known to admit explicit solutions in special cases, such as (i) homogeneous valuations, (ii) constant returns, and (iii) two contestants. But can the model be solved more generally? In this paper, we show that key characteristics of the...

This paper studies mediation in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. In departure from the literature, we assume that all private messages and internal records are publicly revealed at the end of each stage. We call the resulting equilibrium concept mediated subgame perfect...

This paper develops an axiomatic framework for decision making when preferences depend not only on the current alternative but also on the past frequency with which alternatives have been chosen. We identify key independence axioms that characterize frequency-dependent preferences. In addition,...

We examine how absolute and relative gains within reward schemes influence dishonesty. In our online experiment, we vary two payoff dimensions in a cheating mind game: the payoff level and the absolute payoff difference between being successful or not. A higher payoff level has a negative impact...

Advice plays a central role in health, personal finance, and energy-efficiency decisions. We study how a benevolent expert should design verifiable advice - such as whether to commission a diagnostic test of different accuracy - when the agent is behaviorally biased, either neglecting...

We replicate Horváth (2025), experimentally studying link formation and effort in a linear-quadratic game with positive externalities. Across five treatments, subjects exert 38-97 percent more effort than the Nash benchmark yet create too few links, depressing payoffs. In groups of five, the...

International environmental agreements (IEAs) often condition entry into force on ratification by a minimum number of countries, yet deep environmental commitments frequently face strong domestic political resistance. We study how IEA breadth, through minimum ratification thresholds (MRTs), and...

We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the total number of action profiles across states must be strictly less than the sum of the number of players and the...

To address climate change and fulfill its international commitments to reducing carbon emissions, China has accelerated the low-carbon transformation of the thermal power sector through a carbon trading mechanism. However, as the "30·60″ dual-carbon target approaches, the carbon market still...

We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices. Characteristics can lie in an arbitrary Polish space. We...

This paper studies trust, reciprocity, and bargaining using a large-scale online experiment conducted in six Latin American countries. Participants played trust and ultimatum games under randomly assigned conditions in which the gender of their counterpart was either disclosed or withheld. On...

In this paper, we introduce a new class of cost allocation rules for rooted tree cost allocation problems that is based on the position value (Meessen 1988 and Borm et al. 1992). We further extend this by introducing a class of cost allocation rules that, besides these new position rules, also...

Background: From the perspective of product liability, this study explores how agricultural product e-commerce enterprises can enhance the quality of the agricultural product supply chain through quality incentive strategies. Methods: Based on a tripartite evolutionary game model, the strategic...

This study models the auditor-client relationship as a strategic game shaped by two-sided information asymmetry and examines how this structure influences key audit outcomes, namely audit delay and audit fees, in Türkiye. Using a game-theoretic framework complemented by empirical analysis, the...

I study a formal mechanism that can sustain Pareto optimality in a new and very broad class of dilemma games. In the absence of a central authority that could enforce multilateral agreements, the mechanism is based on binding unilateral commitments, which condition a playerís (possibly...

This work addresses whether heterogeneity in player endowments influences investment decisions in common pool resource (CPR) games, shedding light on the relationship between inequality and economic decision making. We explore two theoretical avenues from behavioral economics-linear...

Wage dispersion and job-to-job mobility are central features of modern labour markets, yet canonical equilibrium search models with exogenous job-offer ladders struggle to jointly account for these facts and the magnitude of frictional wage inequality. We develop a continuous-time equilibrium...

We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equilibrium admits a simple characterization and...

This paper examines the potential for pre-play communication to shorten the duration of two-player incomplete-information wars of attrition. If players' types constitute costlessly verifiable information, then all types of players disclose their types, resulting in the war of attrition having...

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are...

In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because...