This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value 'wallet game'. The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour:...

The n-player Tullock contest with complete information is known to admit explicit solutions in special cases, such as (i) homogeneous valuations, (ii) constant returns, and (iii) two contestants. But can the model be solved more generally? In this paper, we show that key characteristics of the...

This paper studies mediation in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. In departure from the literature, we assume that all private messages and internal records are publicly revealed at the end of each stage. We call the resulting equilibrium concept mediated subgame perfect...

During World War II, French Moroccan troops performed numerous acts of (sexual) violence against the Italian population, known in Italy as the Marocchinate. We demonstrate that these events led to contagion in prejudice: They triggered a pronounced shift to the far right following the recent...

We continue the discussion of the taxation game following our presentation in [12]. Our concept describes a cooperative game played between a set of jurisdictions (" countries"). These players admit the operation of a multinational enterprise (MNE, the "firm") within their jurisdiction. The...

Vladimir Putin underestimated the war against Ukraine on several levels, both in terms of the response within Ukraine and, above all, in terms of the response from the US and Europe. What can we learn from this? What policies should Europe pursue? What signals should it send to Putin to prevent...

In a laboratory experiment, we study the role of fairness ideals as focal points in coordination problems in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. We elicit the normatively preferred behavior about how a subsequent coordination game should be played. In homogeneous groups, people share a unique...

The paper examines how the timing of decisions shapes outcomes in coordination settings. Theoretically, the outcomes become predictable and efficient when decisions are made sequentially rather than simultaneously. Our experimental evidence shows that sequential moves promote remarkably high...

Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments...

We study mean-field games of optimal stopping (OS-MFGs) and introduce an entropy-regularized framework to enable learning-based solution methods. By utilizing randomized stopping times, we reformulate the OS-MFG as a mean-field game of singular stochastic controls (SC-MFG) with entropy...

In a laboratory experiment, we study the role of fairness ideals as focal points in coordination problems in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. We elicit the normatively preferred behavior about how a subsequent coordination game should be played. In homogeneous groups, people share a unique...

In a model of asymmetric regulation, a firm can comply with two regulatory targets, and a regulator can audit the firm for compliance. Inspection by the regulator is imperfect, and it assesses the firm’s compliance with the targets with different success probabilities. The firm fully complies...

This paper analyzes the pricing dynamics of product warranties by developing a three-player hierarchical game model involving a manufacturer, an independent service agent, and a consumer. The model provides a scenario where the manufacturer and the agent form a coalition to coordinate pricing...

In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between games that have a discrete type space and those...

I consider an underexplored possible explainer of the "surprising" results of Ultimatum Game experiments, namely, that Proposers and Recipients consider following only some of all the logically possible strategies of their Ultimatum Game. I present an evolutionary analysis of different games...