We examine the economic consequences of the recent adoption of SFAS 123(R) in the United States. Consistent with the conjectures of prior research, our results show that the removal of favorable accounting treatment for stock options post SFAS 123(R) results in a switch from stock options to...

The purpose of this research is to determine what executives can learn from the successful development of the musical band and brand known as U2. To determine this information, a historical study of the U2 journey was conducted with the hopes of uncovering key learning points and takeaways for...

This paper presents a parsimonious, structural model that isolates primary economic determinants of the level and dispersion of managerial ownership, firm scale, and performance and the empirical associations among them. In particular, variation across firms and through time of estimated...

Several countries have implemented bonus taxes for corporate executives in response to the current financial crisis. Using a principal-agent model, this paper investigates the incentive effects of bonus taxes by analyzing the agent's and principal's behavior. Specifically, we show how bonus...

This study examines the effects of the introduction of the FASB statement 123 (R) on corporate performance and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in high-technology firms. The total CEO compensation and short- and long-term compensations were tested regarding corporate performance. Panel...

This study examines the relationship between corporate performance and the Chief Executive Officer compensation in high-technology firms in the S&P 1500. The total CEO compensation and short and long-term compensations were tested regarding corporate performance. A panel data SUR model is...

Companies can increase executive compensation by allowing dividends to be paid on unvested restricted stocks grants, also known as stealth compensation. Examining all S&P 500 firms over the period 2003–2007, we find that more than half of the dividend paying firms allow this practice. We look...

Using the executive stock option (ESO) backdating scandal as a backdrop, this paper examines whether compensation committees can effectively set executive compensation contracts in the presence of a founding CEO. Analyzing a sample of firms accused of backdating ESO grant dates and a control...

Most extant studies consider golden parachutes as the totality of change-in-control payments. However, for the median CEO of firms listed in the S&P SmallCap 600 index in 2009, golden parachute payments are only 46% of total change-in-control compensation. We measure total change-in-control...

This paper investigates empirically the Bolton et al. (2006) hypothesis, according to which initial shareholders may provide incentives to managers to take actions that stimulate speculative bubbles. We test this hypothesis with data on up to 8544 directors and up to 1677 companies between...