The conference is intended to bring together researchers who are interested in the evolutionary foundations of economic and social behavior, evolutionary game theory, and learning in games. We welcome submissions from anyone working in these areas, both theoretical and experimental/empirical work.

Three lectures on economic design will be given on Monday 27 June 2016 in Lund, Sweden, by - Professor Federico Echenique, Caltech "Revealed Preference Theory" - Professor Lars Ehlers, University of Montreal "Strategy-Proofness in Markets with Indivisibilities" - Professor William Thomson,...

The ambition to design allocation mechanisms and voting rules that satisfy various desirable criteria (efficiency, strategy-proofness, fairness, equality, anonymity, neutrality, etc.) has a long tradition and also been high on the agenda of economic research in recents decades. The research has...

Communication in strategic situations may potentially serve a variety of purposes such as coordination, persuasion, commitment or the exchange of private information. The theoretic analysis of communication has produced an impressive amount of results and new insights but also revealed a number...