26th Arne Ryde Symposium 2007 "Communication in Games and Experiments"
Communication in strategic situations may potentially serve a variety of purposes such as coordination, persuasion, commitment or the exchange of private information. The theoretic analysis of communication has produced an impressive amount of results and new insights but also revealed a number of subtle modeling issues. Starting a quarter of a century ago a traditional game-theoretic approach has later on been supplemented by evolutionary and behavioral models. A growing body of experimental evidence constitutes both a challenge and a source of inspiration for theory. The 26th Arne Ryde Symposium will be an effort to further the insights from research on communication in strategic settings to new groups of economists and to provide a forum for scholars in this research area to exchange ideas and results. Researchers within the field are encouraged to submit theoretic or experimental work. [gemäß den Informationen des Anbieters - according to site editor's information] The website is no longer available.
|Event dates:||2007-08-24 – 2007-08-25|
|Deadline Call for Papers:||2007-04-30|
|Organizer:||Arne Ryde Foundation at the Department of Economics, Lund University|
Hans Carlsson and Håkan Holm Email: email@example.com Phone: +46 46 2229549 Fax: +46 46 2224118 Postal address: Department of Economics Lund University Box 7082 SE-22007 Lund Sweden
|Classification:||C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C9 - Design of Experiments|
|Event type:||Seminare, Summer Schools, Symposien, Workshops; Seminars, Summer Schools, Symposiums, Workshops|
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005873585