Последовательные труэли: равновесие с выживанием сильнейшего

A sequential truel is a generalisation of duel. This type of games is known because of the «survival of the weakest» paradox, where weakest player have the highest probability of survival. We analyse a typical variation of this model, in which players are allowed to shoot in the air. We show that there exists a SPE-equilibrium, where the strongest player, against the paradox statement, has the highest probability of survival.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2022-12-25
Authors:	Dmitry, Ilinskiy ; Sergey, Izmalkov ; Alexey, Savvateev

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English ; Russian
Notes:	Dmitry, Ilinskiy and Sergey, Izmalkov and Alexey, Savvateev (2022): Последовательные труэли: равновесие с выживанием сильнейшего.
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015269164