52. Information in rent-seeking contests

We examine equilibrium of the seminal Tullock rent-seeking contest in cases where players do not have complete information about the valuation of the contested rent. We focus on equilibrium existence and uniqueness. We consider cases with incomplete information, one-sided asymmetric information, signaling, and information disclosure.

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Year of publication:	2025
Authors:	Schoonbeek, Lambert
Published in:	Elgar encyclopedia of public choice. - Cheltenham, UK : Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 978-1-80220-775-0. - 2025, p. 369-373

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Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.4337/9781802207750.00057 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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