A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles

Abstract This paper provides a new characterization of belief consistency in extensive games. We show that all consistent assessments are supported by sequences of strategy profiles with the property that all actions with vanishing probability are played according to power functions of the sequence index. The result makes it simpler to prove or disprove that a given assessment is consistent, facilitating the use of sequential equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Dilmé, Francesc
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Berlin/Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 1432-1270. - Vol. 53.2023, 2, p. 673-693
Publisher:	Berlin/Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Subject:	Belief consistency \| Sequential equilibria \| Power sequences

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1007/s00182-023-00874-z [DOI]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015400908