A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule in object allocation problem for an arbitrary number of objects

Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.

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Year of publication:	June 2021
Authors:	Sakai, Ryosuke ; Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publisher:	Osaka, Japan : The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Subject:	Multi-object allocation problem \| Strategy-proofness \| Efficiency \| Minimumprice Walrasian rule \| Non-quasi-linear preference \| Heterogeneous objects \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Allgemeines Gleichgewicht \| General equilibrium \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency