A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule in object allocation problem for an arbitrary number of objects

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.

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Year of publication:	2021
Authors:	Sakai, Ryosuke ; Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publisher:	Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Subject:	Multi-object allocation problem \| Strategy-proofness \| Efficiency \| Minimumprice Walrasian rule \| Non-quasi-linear preference \| Heterogeneous objects

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; 1134
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1761777238 [GVK] hdl:10419/248594 [Handle] RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1134 [RePEc]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; d47 ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793775