A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Sakai, Ryosuke ; Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Allgemeines Gleichgewicht \| General equilibrium \| Allokation \| Allocation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
Series:	ISER DP ; No. 1134
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 2, 2021 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3859893 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; d47 ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224740