A Characterization of the Shapley Value in Queueing Problems.

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A Queue has been organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Maniquet, F.
Institutions:	Faculté des Sciences Économiques, Sociales et de Gestion (FSESG), Université de Namur
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| ECONOMIC MODELS

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Series:	Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	15 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776078