A class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information

Christian Ewerhart and Dan Kovenock

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the agent's valuation of that battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.

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Year of publication:	November 2019
Authors:	Ewerhart, Christian ; Kovenock, Daniel J.
Publisher:	Zurich : University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Subject:	Colonel Blotto games \| private information \| Bayes-Nash equilibrium \| information rents \| networks \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory