A class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information

Christian Ewerhart and Dan Kovenock

In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M ≤ N, full-support type distributions, and network games.

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Year of publication:	February 2021 ; Revised version
Authors:	Ewerhart, Christian ; Kovenock, Daniel J.
Publisher:	Zurich : University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Subject:	Colonel Blotto games \| private information \| Bayes-Nash equilibrium \| generalized Dirichlet distributions \| networks \| Netzwerk \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Ressourcenallokation \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Nash equilibrium \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model